San Francisco Juvenile Probation Department Electronic Monitoring Program: Evaluation and Recommendations
Final Report – Spring 2022
The Goldman School of Public Policy at the University of California, Berkeley is a top-tier educational institution that emphasizes public leadership, social justice and rigorous quantitative and qualitative analysis. This report is submitted in partial fulfillment of the course requirements for the Goldman School’s Master of Public Policy degree, for which students work with real world clients to apply their skills to important policy questions under the guidance of an expert in the field. The judgements and conclusions are solely those of the author and are not necessarily endorsed by the Goldman School of Public Policy, the University of California, or any other agency.

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Finally, I would like to acknowledge the San Francisco Juvenile Probation Department for letting me be a part of its mission to promote better opportunities for justice-involved youth, and especially share my gratitude for the help of Maria McKee, who served as my liaison for the project.

¹ The full list of interviewees can be found in Appendix VII.
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Executive Summary

San Francisco Juvenile Probation Department (JPD) utilizes an electronic monitoring program (hereafter, “EM”) with GPS-tracking ability as an alternative to detention. The goal of EM is to provide a less restrictive intervention for youth than detention where possible while maintaining public safety. However, substantial concerns that such programs replicate or only minimally reduce the harms of detention and/or inadequately prevent and deter criminal activity cast doubt upon the program’s ability to meet JPD’s goals. Moreover, the workload of an electronic monitoring program may also inhibit probation departments’ overall functioning. To evaluate the effectiveness of EM as a detention alternative, this report measures EM’s impact on youth wellbeing, public safety, and JPD operations and compares these outcomes not only to detention, but also JPD’s other two detention alternative programs: Young Community Developers’ Evening Reporting Center program (ERC) and Mission Neighborhood Centers’ Home Detention program (MNC HD). This evaluation particularly examines program use and outcomes from July 2018 – December 2021.

While this report finds that EM is better than detention across all areas of youth wellbeing evaluated, this program harms participants. Like the other detention alternatives, this program returns youth to their communities and can support parents’ authority over their children. Additionally, the program removes justice-involved youth from the places, people, and situations that may encourage criminal activity and be dangerous to the youth. EM is less restrictive and harmful to youth than most juvenile electronic monitoring programs elsewhere in California.

However, the program falls short of JPD’s reputation as an innovator of progressive juvenile justice. The experience of EM participation, like detention, takes a mental toll on participants, and stigma from the device can hurt the youth’s families, relationships, and access to services. The conditions of the program are not age appropriate for younger juveniles and can burden participants’ families. Participants are on EM for longer than is necessary, and program failure, at 45%, and the reincarceration rate, at 30% for failures, are high. Moreover, there are large racial and ethnic disparities in the demographics of whom is ordered to electronic monitoring, the age at which youth are first ordered to EM, the length of time a youth is monitored, and average program success rates. Based on these shortcomings, EM is not good alternative to detention for youth, and JPD’s other detention alternatives better serve youths’ overall needs.

Findings on EM’s ability to uphold public safety were mixed. Across the various measures of recidivism and time frames studied in this evaluation, EM recidivism rates were not shown to be statistically different from those of release without EM. Additionally, EM participants had .64 more overall referrals and .42 more referrals leading to petitions, on average, one year after their arrest than detained youth. EM offers the greatest surveillance potential over youth released from detention; however, the way EM is currently implemented is a threat to public safety. Gaps in the monitoring of and response to violations greatly weaken the protection of the public and create tensions between program stakeholders. Victims do not consider EM, nor any of the other alternatives to detention, to be a strong safeguard against additional criminal activity.
Regarding JPD operations, closely monitoring EM data and checking in with youth on every flagged violation is time demanding for probation officers. However, the program can help them learn about the youth on their caseload. The other detention alternatives provide more in-depth reports on the youth while also taking up less of the probation officers’ time than EM.

The extent of EM’s harms to youth identified in this evaluation underscore than EM is not an adequate alternative to detention, particularly for a city that prides itself on its progressiveness. However, as it is still an improvement over detention, use of this program may be necessary until a better alternative can be established. Until that time, this evaluation recommends JPD make the following modifications to EM to minimize harm to youth:

1. In order to decrease the stigma and difficulty of the program, JPD should substitute the device used for one that is more inconspicuous and has a longer battery life.
2. JPD should not use EM for any youth under the age of 14 and create other clear eligibility criteria for program participation given the harm and strict requirements of the program. This will safeguard against unnecessary use or use on participants who would not be able to meet the requirements. Youth that are younger than 14 or that do not have the capacity to meet the program requirements should be placed on a less restrictive detention alternative instead.
3. To ensure their wellbeing and successful rehabilitation, any youth placed on EM should be provided a case manager from a community-based organization that will support the youth in meeting probation conditions and connect them to any needed services.
4. The program should never exceed 90 days in length, and the standard maximum program length should be 30 days.

JPD would also improve the implementation of EM by doing the following:
5. JPD should designate a monitoring role that can more closely monitor the devices and facilitate more expedient responses to violations.
6. JPD should enhance data collection by improving data accuracy as well as by starting to track reasons for failure, easing the ability and accuracy of future program evaluations.
7. JPD should standardize consequences for program violations to provide more rapid and fair responses and increase public safety and youths’ accountability in the program.
8. Any time spent on electronic monitoring should be used as credits toward time served for adjudicated youth given the restrictive nature of the program.

As first steps towards moving away from electronic monitoring, JPD should strengthen its other detention alternative options:
9. JPD should create other detention alternatives for youth from Alameda County and Contra Costa County due to their large numbers and disproportionate assignment to detention and electronic monitoring.
10. JPD should add weekend activities to the Evening Reporting Center and consider creating another center location to minimize the need for EM and/or dual enrollment.
JPD’s Electronic Monitoring Program

History and Use

JPD’s electronic monitoring program has existed since 2006, and the current private vendor of the program is SCRAM of California.\(^2\) Between July 2018 - December 2021, 288 youth were placed on EM. Over 100 youth were placed on EM more than once, including 13 that were on it more than three times. On average, a youth placed on EM had 1.55 episodes of monitoring.\(^3\) In 2020, JPD documented more enrollments in EM than in any other program or service for justice involved youth,\(^4\) which may be in part due to the limitations that the pandemic caused on other community-based programs.

Program Design

When a youth is ordered to EM, the youth wears an ankle monitor with GPS tracking capability at all times. The youth is given a schedule with requirements for where they should be at specific times, including a nightly curfew and often school, program, and work activities. Many are also given stayaway orders, which ban the youth from entering specific geographic areas, such as victims’ residences or known gang territories.

The SCRAM GPS Ankle Monitor Bracelet, the device currently used by the program, requires two hours of charging per night. The device relays the youth’s location at least once per minute by satellite,\(^5\) and probation officers can live monitor their clients on a map, review recent violations, and see the youth’s battery level in a secure web-based interface.\(^6\)

Other EM conditions include not tampering with or removing the device, not submerging the device in water, promptly answering one’s telephone and door, allowing one’s location and calls with probation officers to be recorded, maintaining personal hygiene around the device, and disclosing one’s health status and pre-existing conditions.\(^7\)

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\(^2\) Mila Baranov (JPD Supervising Probation Officer) in discussion with the author, February 11, 2022.
\(^3\) Dataset compiled by the author.
\(^6\) Martha Martinez (JPD Supervising Probation Officer) in discussion with the author, March 4, 2022.
\(^7\) SCRAM of California, SCRAM of California GPS Program Participant Agreement.
Notifications of any violations, including breaking the set schedule, entering stayaway areas, tampering with or removing the device, or not charging the device, are emailed and/or texted to the youth’s probation officer. Additionally, SCRAM of California provides JPD a daily master report of all violations for all participants. Probation officers have discretion over immediate responses to violations, and the juvenile court judge may respond to violations at the youth’s next court date.

Program length and success is determined at the discretion of the judge, though JPD, the youth and their families, victims, and attorneys may share their perspectives with the judge. The one exception is that tampering or removing the device automatically ends the program in failure. Between July 2018 – December 2021, the mean length of the program was 54 days, and the median was 37.

**Intended Purpose**

As part of its departmental mission, JPD seeks to use the least restrictive intervention possible for justice-involved youth, prompting their use of detention alternatives as a graduated step between release and detention. However, JPD is also responsible for upholding the safety of victims and the larger San Francisco public.

As a detention alternative, JPD intends to improve the wellbeing of justice-involved youth while also protecting the public. The program releases youth back to their homes, allows them to be around friends and family, and returns them to school, work, and any other community engagements. Meanwhile, constricting and tracking the youth’s whereabouts through their monitoring devices is intended to maintain public safety. The monitors not only make it more likely for someone to get caught if they commit another crime, but also serve as a deterrent for crime by limiting situations where criminal behavior may occur and increasing the effort required to commit a crime.

With the same intended purposes, JPD also uses two other alternatives, in combination with or instead of EM, for home supervision as described under WIC 628.1: the Young Community Developers’ Evening Reporting Center Program and Mission Neighborhood Centers’ Home
Detention Program. By having this assortment of options, JPD hopes to have a range of graduated sanctions to ensure that youth receive the least restrictive intervention given their risk level.

The Path to The Program

The County of San Francisco makes great effort to divert youth from JPD-involvement and detention in the first place. At intake, based on their alleged crime, an arrested youth may be diverted through the Community Assessment and Resource Center (CARC) or informal probation rather than processed through the courts. If the case is referred to the District Attorney’s Office (DA), which is required for some offenses and circumstances, the DA may also divert the youth into the Make-It-Right program, which is a restorative community conferencing program, the Unaccompanied Children Assistance Program, or informal probation instead of filing a petition with the court. If the youth does not complete a diversion program or informal probation and the case is filed, the youth will be adjudicated by the juvenile court.

For youth 14 or older, state law mandates detention at the point of arrest for some circumstances and crimes, such as 707(b) offenses, which include serious crimes like homicide, attempted homicide, robbery, rape, and assault with great bodily injury, among others. Other youth may be detained based on their high score on JPD’s Detention Risk Instrument (DRI) or at the discretion of the supervising probation officer. The reasons cited for supervisor discretion between July 2018 and December 2021 include offense characteristics and criminal history, inability to contact a parent or guardian for release, parental request, youth or victim safety, courtesy hold for another county, probation violations, or a combination thereof.

If a youth is detained, they will have a detention hearing, at which point the judge has discretion in all cases to release the youth without conditions, release the youth with conditions, or continue to detain the youth. Release with conditions may involve an alternative to detention, such as EM. Judge Daniel Flores, who formerly served as San Francisco’s juvenile court judge, explained that the decision to release is not based upon the severity of the alleged crime, but risk that release poses to the safety of the public and the youth.

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8 Emily Fox (JPD Community Partnership & Strategy Coordinator) in discussion with the author, February 23, 2022.
9 San Francisco Juvenile Probation Department, Data Deep Dive: JPD Detention Risk Instrument (DRI) Analysis, Celina Cuevas and Maria McKee, 8-9.
10 Dataset compiled by the author.
11 Hon. Daniel Flores (Judge) in discussion with the author, February 18, 2022.
Youth may also be committed to Juvenile Hall post-adjudication if the charges are found to be true, and alternatives to detention may also be used as part a condition of probation, at the judge’s discretion.

Finally, alternatives to detention are sometimes used as graduated sanctions as well for youth who are not currently detained, but have not been meeting their probation conditions and would otherwise be detained as a consequence.\(^\text{12}\)

While JPD does not directly make the decision to put a youth on EM (in San Francisco, EM is only court-ordered), the department does make recommendations to the court. JPD often recommends the program for out-of-county youth since JPD does not have the same ability to supervise youth that live farther away. Additionally, JPD may recommend EM for cases involving youth known to be or suspected of being in gangs, domestic violence cases, or other cases where youth or victim safety is concerned, and particularly when ensuring that the youth stay out of certain geographic areas is important. JPD does not recommend EM for youth placed in group homes since they already have constant supervision, nor some youth who have already previously failed the EM program multiple times.\(^\text{13}\)

\(^\text{12}\) Mila Baranov in discussion with the author.  
\(^\text{13}\) Ibid.
Study Motivation

This study is crucial due to the increase in JPD use of EM since the COVID-19 pandemic, the potential harms of electronic monitoring, and the dearth of research in this field.

Potential Failings of Electronic Monitoring Programs

Nationwide concerns about electronic monitoring urge strong caution in using such programs.

Youth Wellbeing

Due to the heavy restrictions of electronic monitoring programs, some youth advocates frame electronic monitoring not as an alternative to detention, but as an alternative form of detention.\textsuperscript{14} To youth, the restrictiveness and mental toll of the program may be similar to that of detention. Moreover, electronic monitoring may lead to net-widening, meaning lead to more restrictive interventions, if the program is used on youth that would have been released in the absence of an electronic monitoring program.\textsuperscript{15} Additionally, electronic monitoring may perpetuate detention if violations of the program requirements result in the youth’s reincarceration.\textsuperscript{16} Overly-long electronic monitoring assignments could also reduce these programs’ effectiveness as longer program lengths are associated with higher violation rates and probability of failure.\textsuperscript{17}

Electronic monitoring programs can also create family burdens if the conditions of the program impact those living with the program participant.\textsuperscript{18} If use of the program is not accompanied by wider systematic change, these programs can also perpetuate racial and ethnic disparities in juvenile and criminal justice systems.\textsuperscript{19} Program stigma and geofencing requirements can also

\begin{itemize}
  \item Perpetuates Detention
  \item Burdens Families
  \item Perpetuates Racial & Ethnic Disparities
  \item Damages Relationships
  \item Restricts Service Access
  \item Harmful to Youth Safety
  \item Not Age Appropriate
\end{itemize}

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\textsuperscript{17} Cross et al, “Reducing the Use of Pretrial Electronic Monitoring”; Pearson, “‘An Evaluation of Winnipeg’s Electronic Monitoring Pilot Project for Youth Auto Theft Offenders,’ 44.
damage relationships, restrict access to needed services, and undermine youth’s health and safety. Given the mental development of juveniles, burdensome program requirements may set the youth up for failure.

Utilizing a program with these characteristics would go against JPD’s mission and status as progressive leader in juvenile justice as such a program would go against JPD’s commitments to the wellbeing of justice-involved youth and racial equity.

Public Safety

Electronic monitoring may also be a threat to public safety as the program quickly returns potential offenders to their communities before any substantial rehabilitation has taken place. Many also believe electronic monitoring lacks the punitiveness to deter crime and is easy to escape. Within San Francisco, as recently as October 2021, Mayor London Breed noted concerns about the city’s adult probation electronic monitoring program’s ability to deter and prevent crime. In particular, some fear that releasing a youth on electronic monitoring puts victims at risk and/or deters victims from engaging in the court processes.

JPD Operations

There is also some question about whether electronic monitoring programs support effective probation operations. Electronic monitoring programs may be technically difficult for staff to understand and use, and the program itself, particularly if the technology does not work well, may require more work from staff than is worthwhile.

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26 Edna Erez, Peter R. Ibarra, William D. Bales, and Oren M. Gur, “GPS Monitoring Technologies and Domestic Violence: An Evaluation Study,” June 2012, ii; Michele Fisher (Deputy Chief, San Francisco Sheriff’s Office) and Alissa Riker (Director of Programs, San Francisco Sheriff’s Office) in discussion with the author, April 6, 2022.
Research Shortcomings

Finding research on electronic monitoring that is relevant to San Francisco can be difficult as programs vary significantly across localities in terms of participation eligibility, rules and conditions, violation consequences, and other aspects of program design. Furthermore, evidence on electronic monitoring’s impact on recidivism rates has been inconsistent. While electronic monitoring is intended to support rehabilitation and therefore decrease recidivism, studies often find no significant difference, or slight increases, in the recidivism rates between those on electronic monitoring and those detained.28

Importantly, few rigorous studies have been done on juveniles specifically.29 Part of this may be due to the lower numbers of justice-involved youth as compared to adults as well as the difficulty in gathering data on youth. Researchers may have difficulty accessing individual data and case notes for justice-involved youth due to additional concerns about privacy and confidentiality, and probation departments often lack the capacity to conduct in-depth research themselves.30 However, such a trend is still surprising given that electronic monitoring programs have been around for decades and are widely used in juvenile justice systems around the country.


30 Catherine Crump (Director, Samuelson Law, Technology and Public Policy Clinic) in discussion with the author, April 19, 2022.
Evaluation Framework

Criteria

The criteria for evaluating the effectiveness of EM with regards to youth wellbeing, public safety, and JPD operations was developed based on the potential harms of electronic monitoring programs outlined in the previous section.

Youth Wellbeing

To measure how the program affects youth wellbeing, this evaluation assessed EM on **Liberty**, **Family Burden**, **Relationships**, **Accessibility**, **Access to Services**, **Safety**, and **Racial and Ethnic Disparities**. These categories were adapted from Gresham Sykes’s Five Pains of Imprisonment Framework and were fleshed out to include additional concerns noted the literature review and interviews.31

- The impact these programs have on a youth’s **Liberty** include the psychological toll of the program, the number of days spent in detention, the length of the program, and program’s net-widening potential.
- **Family Burden** relates to the impact of the program on the family’s time, resources, and daily life.
- The **Relationships** category refers to the youth’s ability to form and maintain healthy relationships with friends, family, and the wider community while in the program.
- The program’s **Accessibility** is based on the rigidity and achievability of the conditions of the program given the youth’s needs and ability.
- **Access to Services** denotes the youth’s ability to access needed and rehabilitative services that meet their individual needs due to the program.
- **Safety** encompasses the physical health and safety of the youth.
- **Racial and Ethnic Disparities** include differences in inclusion, treatment, or experiences in EM among racial and ethnic groups.

Public Safety

This report assesses the program’s impact on public safety by evaluating **Recidivism**, **Enforcement Mechanisms**, and **Victim Perception**. While public safety determinations are often limited to recidivism rate findings, this study also included other important public safety concerns raised in the literature review and interviews.

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31 Kevin Haggerty and Sandra Bucerius, “The Proliferating Pains of Imprisonment,” *Incarceration*, July 2020. Sykes developed the theory of the Five Paints of Imprisonment, which include Deprivations of Liberty, Autonomy, Heterosexual Relationships, Goods and Services, and Safety, in the 1960s to illuminate damages inflicted by imprisonment. While some of the categories are outdated and may not be comprehensive, the framework is still often adapted and used in criminological research as a basis for understanding and comparing the pain inflicted by detention.
• **Recidivism** reflects the continuance of delinquency during or following JPD intervention.\textsuperscript{32}

• **Enforcement Mechanism** evaluates how EM monitors participants and protects against continued wrongdoing.

• **Victim Perception** includes victims’ reactions, both emotional and behavioral, to EM.

**JPD Operations**

Evaluating EM’s effect on JPD operations as a whole is also important for understanding how the program fits into JPD’s mission.

• Measuring the **Program Workload** illustrates how conducting the program impacts the department’s ability to carry out its overall mission.

\textsuperscript{32} Maria McKee, note to the author, May 2, 2022.
Electronic Monitoring Program Alternatives

In the effort to contextualize findings on JPD’s electronic monitoring program, this evaluation compares EM findings to that of detention and JPD’s other two detention alternatives where possible. Note that the findings on these alternatives are more cursory as these programs were not the focus of the evaluation.

Juvenile Hall

Youth detained in San Francisco are detained at Juvenile Hall. While at Juvenile Hall, youth receive educational, medical, and mental health services in addition to counseling and socialization skill training from staff.33 The city planned to close the facility in December 2021, but this has been postponed indefinitely until alternatives are finalized.34

Other Detention Alternative Programs

The Evening Reporting Center

ERC is a subprogram of Young Community Developers (YCD)’s Re-Entry Integrative Services for Employment (RISE) program.35 YCD is a community-based organization that provides training and support opportunities in the Bayview Hunters Point neighborhood.36 For this program, youth are picked up after school on weekdays and taken to the center for programming from 4:00-8:00 P.M. Center activities include homework help, life skill building projects and conversations, and fieldtrips. The youth are then dropped off at home, where the youth are meant to remain until school the next day. There are no weekend activities. Staff provide probation officers weekly reports on the youth’s progress.37

YCD began this program approximately fifteen years ago at the request of JPD, and the program was modeled after a similar program in Chicago that noted that most juvenile crime occurred in the time period immediately following the end of the school day. Between 2018-2021, 42 youth were enrolled in ERC, and 22 out of 45 program episodes overlapped with an EM episode.38 On average, there are only 1-2 youth enrolled in the program at a given time, though up to 10 may be enrolled at once.39

The Home Detention Program

The Home Detention Program is run by Mission Neighborhood Centers, a community-based organization that offers educational programming and social services to low-income seniors,

35 Valentina Sedeno, email to the author, May 6, 2022.
37 Valentina Sedeno (Re-Entry Services Program Manager, Young Community Developers) in discussion with the author, April 5, 2022.
38 Dataset compiled by the author.
39 Valentina Sedeno in discussion with the author.
youth, and families in San Francisco.\textsuperscript{40} Under Home Detention, the youth and their parent or guardian receive nightly curfew calls from a case manager to ensure that the youth are home as well as to check on the youth’s wellbeing and activities. In contrast to what the name of the program suggests, the youth largely have autonomy over what they do during the day, but after the curfew call, the youth is expected to stay home for the rest of the night. Based on the referral or court-order, case managers may also connect youth and their families to other service providers and resources. Case managers often help with coordinating school supports services, and case managers provide probation officers weekly reports on the youth’s activities and progress.\textsuperscript{41} HD runs for a minimum of 90 days, but may be extended.\textsuperscript{42}

Between July 2018 and December 2021, 136 youth were enrolled in MNC HD between 2018-2021, and 40 of 141 episodes overlapped with an electronic monitoring episode.\textsuperscript{43}

\textbf{Data}

JPD provided two quantitative datasets for this evaluation covering July 2018 to December 2021. The first, provided by SCRAM of California, included the names of all of JPD’s EM participants, as well as the start and end dates of their last episode on the program, the length of that episode, and whether the episode was successfully completed or not. The second included JPD’s own data on all referrals (juvenile arrests), bookings, petition filings (cases taken to court), and petition outcomes (court rulings) as well as program referrals, court-ordered conditions, and risk assessment data. This data showed 2,620 referrals for 1,344 people between July 1, 2018 and December 31, 2020. Fourteen of those referrals were for alleged offenders later found to be over 18 years of age, leaving 2,602 referrals for analysis. The combined SCRAM and JPD data provided information on the 477 referrals to EM that happened during this time period.\textsuperscript{44}

JPD also provided contact and case notes for EM participants, which was used to verify program dates and interview notes and better understand the causes and consequences of violations.

The data provided by JPD was granted by court order. As permitted by the Court, the data included personally identifiable information, including for sealed records. All data was stored and handled securely through the California Policy Lab at the University of California, Berkeley. No identified data is included in this report, and efforts have been made to mask particularly small sample sizes in order to prevent any possible re-identification.

Finally, interviews of key stakeholders, including JPD probation officers, a former juvenile court judge for San Francisco, a victim advocate, detention alternative program service providers, a former EM participant, probation staff in other departments and other local counties, and other JPD staff, were conducted over the course of the evaluation.\textsuperscript{45} Together, this group of

\textsuperscript{40} “Our Organization,” Mission Neighborhood Centers, 2022.
\textsuperscript{41} Emily Fox, Gustavo Santana (Site Coordinator, Mission Neighborhood Centers), and Michelle Santiago (Home Detention Program Case Manager, Mission Neighborhood Centers) in discussion with the author.
\textsuperscript{42} Gustavo Santana and Michelle Santiago in discussion with the author.
\textsuperscript{43} Dataset compiled by the author.
\textsuperscript{44} For greater detail on the data, see Appendix V: Data Quality.
\textsuperscript{45} The full list of interviewees can be found in Appendix VII.
interviewees was able to provide extensive background information about electronic monitoring programs, the juvenile justice processes, and the local juvenile justice landscape as well as youth, victim, and staff perspectives of EM. Additionally, two researchers who have extensively studied electronic monitoring were consulted for their advice on conducting such an evaluation as well as their knowledge of this field.

**Methodology**

**Recidivism Rates**

While the total data from July 2018 to December 2021 included 2,606 referrals to JPD, the dataset used for comparing recidivism rates between detention, release with EM, or release without EM, was limited to first referrals. This was done in order to limit confounders of prior justice involvement and prior treatment and experience with the Juvenile Probation Department that could not be included in the model, but would affect both likelihood of EM participation and recidivism. However, if a youth had multiple referrals on their date of first referral, these observations were combined based on the understanding that the decision to detain the youth, release the youth on EM, or release the youth without EM would be made with all referrals from that day in mind.

For the purposes of this study, a youth was considered released without EM if they were detained for less than eight days after the referral and not placed on EM. A youth was considered detained if they were detained for eight or more days and not placed on EM. A youth was considered released with EM if they were detained for less than eight days and then ordered to EM without being dual-enrolled in another detention alternative or detained. If a youth was dual-enrolled in another detention alternative (9), was detained for more than seven days before being placed on EM (28), or was released for several months before being placed on EM (<5), the observation was dropped in order to not confuse the influence of various treatments.

Based on this sorting, there were 29 observations for youth placed on EM, 114 observations for detained youth, and 862 for youth released after their first referral to JPD.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>First Referral Detention Decision</th>
<th>Number of Youth</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Released with EM</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Detained</td>
<td>114</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Released without EM</td>
<td>862</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Overall</td>
<td>1007</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Several counts of recidivism were then generated for each youth. The number of additional referrals a youth received was calculated for the first six months and the first year after their first referral. Some youth, whether released without EM, released with EM, or detained, later received referrals for home detention violations, placement failures, or jurisdictional transfers. As these do not involve new criminal activity in San Francisco, a separate recidivism count was created excluding referrals that did not involve new criminal offenses over the same two time periods. Additionally, the number of referrals that a youth received that were eventually filed as petitions by the District Attorney’s Office over those same two time periods was calculated. Note that the number of referrals that led to petition filings may be higher than the actual number of petitions.
that were filed for the youth as some referrals may be merged into one petition to the court. Finally, the occurrence, not counts, of any additional referrals, referrals involving new offenses, and referrals leading to petitions filed, was also noted.

The time period of six months was chosen as an indicator of how being on the treatment or time period immediately following treatment affects recidivism. The one-year time period was the longest time period of follow up possible based on the data because there was not complete recidivism information for youth who turned eighteen before the end of the time period—as any new offenses would go to the adult courts—or for time periods ending after December 31, 2021. The total number of observations, by program, for each time period are as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 1: Nearest Neighbor Matching Sample Sizes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Recidivism Data</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Detained</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Released</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Overall</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Nearest neighbor matching was then used to measure how recidivism for those released with EM compared to those that were detained or released without EM. The EM group was separately matched to detained and released youth based on their treatment of being enrolled in EM. The model included confounding variables that might affect likelihood of treatment, including risk level according to the YLS assessment\[^{46}\], the most serious offense on their referral(s) according to the state’s Summary Code for offenses, the youth’s race and ethnicity, gender\[^{47}\], and age at arrest. The output for variations of the model using different iterations of these and additional covariates is included in Appendix II for transparency in how the results may vary based on the covariates included.

\[
\text{Recidivism} = \beta_1 + \beta_2(EM \text{ Participation}) \ast + \beta_3(\text{Risk Level}\[^{48}\]) \ast + \beta_4(\text{Highest Offense}) \ast + \beta_5(Gender) \ast + \beta_6(\text{Race and Ethnicity}) \wedge + \beta_7(\text{Age at Arrest}) \ast + \epsilon
\]

* Indicate dummy variables * Indicate continuous variables. \(^\wedge\) Indicate categorical variables.

**Likelihood of Detention Decision Assignment**

A probit regression was used to check for any disparities in likelihood of one detention decision over another. The comparison groups for this model were the same as used in the nearest neighbor model measuring differences in recidivism rates: those detained, released with EM, or released without EM after their first referral to JPD. Because matching was not used and samples

\[^{46}\] A YLS Assessment, or Youth Level of Service Assessment, assesses a youth’s needs or strengths and makes an informed prediction of the youth’s likelihood of reoffending.

\[^{47}\] Gender was tracked as a binary in the data.

\[^{48}\] The youth’s risk level is based on their categorized risk based on their YLS score. The category, rather than the score, was used as the assessment changed over the time period covered by this evaluation, but the categories of risk stayed the same. This variable was still used as a continuous variable in this model to recognize the increasing risk expected by each higher level.
were not limited by time considerations, more covariates could be used to control for confounders, including San Francisco residency status and whether the referral occurred before or after the COVID-19 pandemic began (March 11, 2020).

### Probit Regression Model

\[
\text{Probability(Decision)} = \beta_1 + \beta_2(\text{Risk Level}) + \beta_3(\text{Highest Offense}) + \beta_4(\text{Gender})\Phi + \beta_5(\text{Race and Ethnicity})\wedge + \beta_6(\text{Age at Arrest}) + \beta_7(\text{SF Residency})\Phi + \beta_8(\text{Post-COVID})\Phi + \epsilon
\]

* Indicate dummy variables  
* Indicate continuous variables.  
\wedge Indicate categorical variables.

### Factors Predicting EM Program Outcomes

An OLS regression was run on all EM episode observations to identify what factors, among demographics, episode number, and program length, best predicted the likelihood of successful program completion. While this model is more observational in nature than the previous ones, detecting factors that are correlated with success offers insight into possible hurdles of program success.

### OLS Regression Model

\[
\text{Program Success} = \beta_1 + \beta_2(\text{Gender})\Phi + \beta_3(\text{Age at Program Start}) + \beta_4(\text{Race and Ethnicity})\wedge + \beta_5(\text{Episode Number}) + \beta_6(\text{Program Length})\Phi + \epsilon
\]

* Indicate dummy variables  
* Indicate continuous variables.  
\wedge Indicate categorical variables.

### Descriptive Statistics

Additionally, descriptive statistics were generated from the entire compiled datasets on referrals and program participation. While these do not provide evidence of any differences between programs, they do provide important descriptive information about program use, trends, and outcomes.

### Qualitative Findings

Interviews were coded using content analysis in accordance with the criteria outlined at the beginning of this section, and important themes and quotes were pulled to be included in the analysis below.

### Limitations

#### Lack of Youth Voice

Direct input from current program participants themselves was not able to be gathered. This shortcoming is partially due to privacy concerns and the relatively short timeline of the program, but also the recognition that communities with lived experience should not be burdened with needing to share their experience. Without that viewpoint, however, this analysis is missing an important perspective on the actual experience and impact of this program, particularly in comparison to alternatives. However, the ability to talk to a former EM participant and youth
service providers, read case notes that include interactions with participants, and consult qualitative studies that interviewed young electronic monitoring program participants, including youth in San Francisco, provides some insight into the youth experience on EM.

**Small Sample Sizes**

The number of youth enrolled in EM and involved with JPD generally is relatively small. In order to create a quasi-experimental design that could more accurately provide information about the program, the number of observations was narrowed further. Small sample sizes can increase the margin of error and decrease the statistical power of the model. While the small sample size should be kept in mind throughout this report, the p-values of the findings do support the statistical significance of the findings, and the nearest neighbor matches were balanced.

**Inconsistencies in Electronic Monitoring Data**

There were some data inconsistencies and missing information between the EM datasets provided SCRAM of California and JPD. However, wherever possible, EM participants’ case notes verified the correct information. The cleaned, finalized data set represents the most comprehensive understanding of EM participation possible given data availability and quality for July 2018 – December 2021.

**Omitted Variables and Criteria**

Additionally, the nearest neighbor and probit regression models could only account for confounding factors for which JPD collects data, such as race, age, and highest criminal offense. However, there may be other factors, such as youth personality, gang affiliation, and living situation, that also influence assignment to EM as well as youth and public safety outcomes that were not able to be captured in this study, such as mental health and school performance, that would shed more light on the effectiveness of EM. However, the extent of data points that were able to be captured as well as the method used to analyze this data do provide a solid foundational understanding of the impact of the program.

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49 See Appendix V: Data Quality for full details.
Findings

Youth Wellbeing

Liberty

Key Findings

- EM is better for youth than detention.
- The loss of liberty and trauma of EM is still significant.
- Nearly one-third of unsuccessful EM episodes end in immediate reincarceration.
- Changes in EM use during the pandemic suggest possible net-widening.
- Non-city residents are more likely to receive stricter interventions than residents with similar characteristics.
- The program is longer on average than necessary.
- JPD’s program is less restrictive than most electronic monitoring programs in California.
- The other alternatives to detention are less restrictive.

Impact on youth Liberty was measured based on the psychological toll of the program, the number of days spent in detention, the length of time spent on EM, and program’s net widening potential. The literature review outlined several potential areas for concern in electronic monitoring.50

Electronic Monitoring

If it came up in their interviews, all interviewees agreed that EM was better for the children than detention.51 As Supervising Probation Officer Mila Baranov described, the youth “are sleeping in their own beds, they are wearing their own clothes, they’re with their family, they're able to resume their normal activities in the society, in the open world without really very many limitations.” The program assuredly offers some level of improvement over detention.

However, that improvement appears to be minimal. Several interviews also emphasized that the amount of control JPD imposes over these children through EM is still very damaging. The former EM participant interviewed stressed, “You’ve got to imagine all the trauma that they’re going through.” Youth service provider Valentina Sedeno said that youth have told her that they still feel incarcerated while on the device, and, though she recognized she does not fully know

50 See Study Motivation for more detail.
51 Mila Baranov, Martha Martinez, Valentina Sedeno, and the former EM participant in discussion with the author.
the purpose of the program, she doubted that it warranted the degree of control over the youth and their movement that it does. This sentiment that being on EM could feel just like detention was also shared by justice-involved youth in San Francisco in a qualitative report compiled by the Young Women’s Freedom Center.52

Case Study: Former EM Participant

The former program participant shared in his interview that electronic monitoring can feel “like you are at Juvenile Hall all over again, but at your house” due to requirements about how long he could shower, where he could or could not be at certain times, and what he wore—since he did not want others to be able to see the device. He also emphasized the toll of knowing that he was being watched at all times and seeing the device on his body. He described that while wearing the device, “You feel bad. You feel bad or mad, just waking up with the ankle monitor on.” He also highlighted how disheartening it was sometimes to see the monitor still on his ankle after a long day where he worked hard in school, went to work, and did his homework; “you’re still feeling bad for yourself.” The feeling of being on the ankle monitor has also been hard for him to shake. He noted, “I’m 26 years old now, and I still think about my ankle monitor.”

Nearly a third of EM episodes that ended unsuccessfully—or 13% of EM episodes overall—ended in immediate reincarceration, due to either additional crimes committed or probation violations, which may include EM failure. This may be an underestimate as some additional youth who went AWOL from the program were detained once located. These detentions lasted 32 days on average.53 The frequency and length of this reincarceration numbers reveal that EM is not an alternative to detention for all youth.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Reincarceration Length</th>
<th>Number of Youth</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Under 1 Week</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 Week to 1 Month</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 Month to 50 Days</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50 - 100 Days</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Over 100 Days</td>
<td>&lt;5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The probit regression highlighting what characteristics predict a youth’s assignment to detention, release with EM, or release without EM after their first referral illuminated that some net-widening may be occurring in the program.54 Deputy Probation Officer Jessica Bishop noted that use of electronic monitoring increased during the pandemic due to the increased health concerns of detention during the pandemic. While orders to EM over detention should have increased for referrals after March 2020, the post-covid marker was also the biggest predictor of whether someone was released with EM instead of without, though the pandemic should not have affected decisions between release options. While not conclusive, this finding suggests that the

52 A. Melendrez, “Through Their Eyes,” 46.
53 Dataset compiled by author. Immediate reincarceration refers to rebooking in Juvenile Hall by the end of the EM program, as noted in JPD and SCRAM records. There were 5 additional youth that were detained by the next day.
54 For more information about the probit regression model used to generate these findings, see the previous methodology section. The estimates and the statistical power of these estimates can be found in Appendix III.
increased use of EM during COVID to reduce detention may have spilled over into greater use of those who would otherwise have been released without it.

Additionally, the same probit regression highlighted that out-of-county residents are disproportionately more likely to receive more restrictive interventions than residents with similar risk levels, criminal backgrounds, and demographics.\textsuperscript{55} As mentioned in the program overview, JPD often recommends that out-of-county youth that are being released be placed on electronic monitoring since JPD does not have the same detention alternative options to supervise outside of the city. The probit regression showed that, indeed, when non-residents are released, they are more likely to be released with EM, rather than without EM. However, the regression also showed that non-residents are more likely to be detained than residents with similar characteristics.

The average length of a given episode of EM was 54 days between 2018-2021, and the average total time spent on the program was 84 days. Some program episodes were additionally back-to-back if the youth cut off their device and was immediately put back on the program. Longer program lengths did see higher success rates on average, but only up to four weeks of time. Episodes longer than that had lower average success.

Several interviewees did share concerns that youth are currently on the program for too long, especially given that “there's quite a bit of research that says that after a certain point, it's just not that effective.”\textsuperscript{56} Probation officers Mila Baranov and Jessica Bishop both noted that around the 90-day mark, it is clear whether EM is working for someone or not. Additionally, Bishop asserted that normalizing the feeling of being on probation for youth can perpetuate criminal justice involvement in adulthood.\textsuperscript{57} The former EM participant interview felt that the program should be 1-2 months maximum given the severity of the harm inflicted. He noted that being on electronic monitoring for too long may also make youth think that they would be unable to succeed without it, as happened to him. Several interviewees noted that around two weeks should be the standard length, as it is usually enough time to see whether the youth are capable of following the rules.\textsuperscript{58}

\textsuperscript{55} For more information about the probit regression model used to generate these findings, see the previous methodology section. The estimates and their statistical power of these estimates can be found in Appendix III.
\textsuperscript{56} Emily Fox in discussion with the author.
\textsuperscript{57} Jessica Bishop in discussion with the author.
\textsuperscript{58} Jessica Bishop, Hon. Daniel Flores (Judge), and the former EM participant in discussion with the author.
For comparison, a typical episode in Adult Probation usually lasts 60-90 days. In Santa Clara County, episodes extending beyond 45 days require a review, but many are continued for up to another 45 days.

Compared to other California counties, San Francisco does offer comparatively more freedom in movement in their juvenile electronic monitoring program, being one of only three counties, as of 2019 at least, that that allows the youth freedom of movement before curfew to any place barring exclusion zones. The number of rules for participant is also comparatively low.

Comparison to Other Programs

Though better than detention in terms of liberty, EM is the most restrictive of the detention alternatives.

While the ERC has a much smaller monitoring component and no device, interviewees shared that youth ordered to this program do still see it as a court assignment that must be accomplished rather than an opportunity or activity of interest. However, Deputy Probation Officer Jessica Bishop stated that she likes this program for youth because it alone of the detention alternative programs has a start and stop date built in.

MNC HD is the least restrictive program but also the longest. Youth are only beholden to a phone call a day and can avoid thinking about the program much otherwise. With an average program length of 94 days and a median of 78 days, MNC HD is significantly longer than electronic monitoring. One interviewee, who noted that the program seems to have even increased in length over time, believes that the extended length is causing the program to lose some of its power.

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59 Gabriel Calvillo (Former Supervising Probation Officer, San Francisco Adult Probation Department) in discussion with the author, April 18, 2022.
60 Holly Child in discussion with the author.
63 Valentina Sedeno in discussion with the author.
64 Ibid.
65 Jessica Bishop in discussion with the author.
**Family Burden**

**Key Findings**

- EM program requirements can affect the day-to-day life of the entire family.
- Some parents appreciate, and sometimes even request, EM.
- The other detention alternatives also have both benefits to and burdens on families.

**Family Burden** relates to the impact of the program on the family’s time, resources, and daily life. Especially as low-resourced families cannot afford such burdens, inequitably affecting some youths’ ability to succeed, family burdens should be minimized as much as possible.

**Electronic Monitoring**

San Francisco does not have some of the electronic monitoring program components commonly cited to be burdens to families, such as a fee for participation or requirement to have a landline.\(^{66}\) Moreover, while almost all California counties set time limits on schedule changes, which can be very difficult for low-income families to work around, JPD’s program has no set guidelines on how early a schedule change must be requested.\(^{67}\) In San Francisco, depending on their probation officer, youth and their families can ask their probation officer for permission to be out past curfew or inclusion zones for organized activities or other approved reasons even in real time.\(^{68}\) However, at least one youth did have to ask for permission at least 24-hours in advance.\(^{69}\)

The requirements of the program impact the day-to-day life of the entire family however. The former EM participant noted that his stayaway orders, which covered a large geographic area, were very difficult for his mother since her church and grocery store were in his stayaway zone. She could no longer stop by the store on her way home if he was in the car, which could cause her complications, and she stopped going to her church since he was unable to go with her. Because of the way his orders inhibited the movement of his whole family, he felt like the probation department was intentionally acting against his best interests.

Conversely, many interviewees shared that EM is often appreciated, and sometimes even requested, by parents who feel they have lost control of their children. They like knowing where their child is and that they are safe, and they find it helpful to have supportive reinforcement.\(^{70}\) A more skeptic interviewee noted, however that parents may pretend to be strong advocates for it only because they want to make sure their child is not detained.

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\(^{68}\) Martha Martinez in discussion with the author.

\(^{69}\) A. Melendrez, “Through Their Eyes,” 113.

\(^{70}\) Jessica Bishop in discussion with the author.
**Other Detention Alternatives**

Similar to EM, the other two detention alternatives offer features that some parents appreciate.

The Evening Reporting Center’s ability to pick up and drop off the youth before and after the program relieves parents of the burden of transporting the youths themselves or fearing for their children’s safety if the child uses public transportation. Parents know where their children are and when they will be home.71

With MNC HD, some parents like the ability to get to know their child’s case manager. Other parents get annoyed by the nightly calls, particularly if the program lasts a long time; because they have to answer the calls, the parent may feel that are on probation when they did not do anything wrong.72

In all of these programs, parents get annoyed with JPD if they feel that JPD is not responding to their children’s violations.73 Further elaboration on this can be found in the Enforcement Mechanism section.

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71 Ibid.
72 Jessica Bishop, Gustavo Santana, Michelle Santiago, and Valentina Sedeno in discussion with the author.
73 Jessica Bishop in discussion with the author.
## Relationships

### Key Findings

- EM can help to return youth to their communities and help them to form better relationships with their parents.
- The visibility of the device brings negative attention to the youth, harming their relationships and encouraging isolation.
- Other detention alternatives have the same benefits but lack the stigma since youths’ probation status cannot be identified.

The **Relationships** category evaluates how the program impacts youth’s ability to form and maintain healthy relationships with friends, family, and the wider community. Many interviewees underscored that healthy relationships were the key to successful rehabilitation.\(^ {74}\)

### Electronic Monitoring

EM can be better for the youth than detention as it keeps them from becoming separated from their community and may help them to form better relationships with their parents or caregivers.

However, many interviewees concurred that the visibility of the device brings negative attention to the youth, which harms their relationships with family, friends, and the wider community. Probation Officer Martha Martinez shared that some youths’ attorneys advocate against EM for their clients by citing that “this big monitor [...] makes people look at them differently.” The former EM participant noted that extended family members and others in the community began to look at him like he was “the worst of the worst,” and that people started to make fun of him at school, on the bus, and on the street. He said that that puts more temptation in front of justice-involved youth, because “most kids, they’re going to react” to situations like that. Moreover, because many of the youth on electronic monitoring are people of color,\(^ {75}\) it may reinforce stereotypes.\(^ {76}\)

Early into his term on the juvenile court, Judge Daniel Flores voluntarily wore an electronic monitoring device for a week to get a better understanding of the youths’ experience. In that short week, the device, which he assures “gets noticed,” became a source of embarrassment. He reflected on attending his son’s baseball game, where he noted some parents’ nervousness about him being near their children.\(^ {77}\) Since he had not met all of his son’s teammates’ parents yet, he worried what impression some of the other parents might have of him after seeing the device.

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\(^ {74}\) Jessica Bishop and Martha Martinez in discussion with the author.

\(^ {75}\) See the section on Racial and Ethnic Disparities for greater detail.


\(^ {77}\) Hon. Daniel Flores in discussion with the author.
Youths’ fear of being seen with the device may also prevent them wanting to engage with friends and the community,\textsuperscript{78} and that isolation is counterproductive for their rehabilitation.

\textit{Other Detention Alternatives}

The other program alternatives are better for youth relationships because similar to electronic monitoring, they also enable youth to return to their families, schools, and communities, but unlike electronic monitoring, they leave no outward physical signs of the youth’s enrollment in the program. This way, their offense does not because to define their lives in others’ eyes.

\textsuperscript{78} Former EM Participant in discussion with the author.
Accessibility

Program Accessibility is based on the rigidity and achievability of the conditions of the program given the youth’s needs and ability. Working with the youth as an individual and understanding their needs and abilities is necessary for creating an effective rehabilitative plan that will prevent reinvolvement in the justice system again.\(^{79}\)

Electronic Monitoring

The overall rate for successful completion of EM from July 2018 – December 2021 was 55%.

Completion rates are extremely low for those below the age of 14 at 12%, but this rate increased steadily with age, reaching 83.6% for those 18 and older. A regression on program outcome rates including covariates on other demographic information, program start date, and number of prior EM episodes shows that an extra year of age predicts almost a 10% higher average completion rate. Inversely, the percentage of those failing the program due to failure to meet program requirements, rather than absconding or reoffending, gets smaller as the youth get older.\(^{80}\) This correlation between success and age supports concerns, brought up in interviews and the literature review, that EM is not age appropriate for juveniles due to their stage of mental development.\(^{81}\)

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79 Emily Fox in discussion with the author.
80 Dataset compiled by the author. Note that this information is incomplete as the reason for failure was only included on episodes listed in the SCRAM dataset.
81 A. Melendrez, “Through Their Eyes,” 46.
One best practice for the rehabilitation of justice-involved youth is to measure their progress based on the benchmark of where they started, not necessarily ideal behavior. According to case notes, probation officers do base their assessment of youth progress in EM this way, and youth may successfully complete the program just for improving the frequency with which they meet program requirements, even if their daily record is not perfectly clear of violations.

The flexibility a youth receives for breaking program rules, whether the youth asks beforehand to be late for curfew or retroactively shows remorse for cutting off the device, depends on probation officer discretion. Based on interviews and participants’ case notes, probation officers try to work with youth and their families around needed schedule changes and/or provide second chances for absconding or going into stayaway zones in San Francisco when there is no larger safety concern with it. Such understanding can be very helpful both for increasing compliance and minimizing technical violations.

One of the more difficult requirements for youth appears to be the responsibility to charge the device; it is also one of main program violations. The former EM participant described the rule of consecutive charging—or completing all two hours of daily charging in one sitting—very difficult, as he could not get up to go to the bathroom and it was hard to do homework since he had to be right next to the wall and could not move. He also worked until late at night, so he had to stay up very late to complete the required charging. In the case notes, there were some situations where youth had several low battery violations because they tried to charge their devices while they slept, but the charger kept falling out. Other youth reportedly slept on the floor to make their device charge through the night.

Of the California counties with juvenile electronic monitoring programs, San Francisco is on the stricter end of charging requirements with its requirement for consecutive charging. Seven counties have more specific charging requirements—requiring that charging occur during certain windows during the day—but the large majority do not have any specifications about when and how charging should occur.

Regardless of their charging requirements, charging violations seem to be almost universal in local electronic monitoring programs. The device used by the San Francisco Sheriff’s Department requires an hour of charging every day; however, it can last for up to four days. Between the larger charging window and the check-in fail safes built into the program, devices do not ever go dead in that program.

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82 Crump, “Tracking the Trackers: An Examination of Electronic Monitoring of Youth in Practice,” 816.
83 JPD Participant Case Notes.
84 Martha Martinez in discussion with the author; JPD Participant Case Notes.
86 Mila Baranov and Jessica Bishop in discussion with the author.
87 A. Melendrez, “Through Their Eyes,” 46.
89 Gabriel Calvillo, Michele Fisher, and Alissa Riker in discussion with the author.
90 Michele Fisher and Alissa Riker in discussion with the author.
Other Detention Alternatives

The relatively low requirements of the other programs mean they do not share the same level of accessibility concerns as EM. ERC is accessible to youth in that its main requirement is that youth show up to the center. The staff additionally provide transportation, avoiding potential barriers to participation. The completion rate for the ERC was 68.88% between July 2018 – December 2021. MNC HD offers the greatest flexibility, as there is no constraint on what the youth does during the day, and the youth only needs to be home by curfew and stay home for the rest of the night, a requirement shared by the other detention alternatives. Indeed, with an 81.56% completion rate, MNC HD has the highest success rate of the alternatives to detention.

Electronic Monitoring Combined with Other Detention Alternatives

EM is frequently paired with MNC HD and ERC. Several interviewees shared concerns that dual or triple enrollment in these programs can be too much for youth to handle, particularly since they are often also in school, sports, and other treatment programs and/or working.91 YCD, the service provider for ERC, has even declined referrals involving dual enrollment before due to concerns that the child would be overwhelmed, particularly since they feel ERC’s role is largely supervision, which should already be covered by these other programs.92 Other reports on electronic monitoring have also noted that enrollment in multiple detention alternative programs “raises the possibility that young people will “fail out” of electronic monitoring programs.”93

91 Emily Fox, Gustavo Santana, Michelle Santiago, Valentina Sedeno, and the former EM participant in discussion with the author.
92 Valentina Sedeno in discussion with the author.
93 Crump, “Tracking the Trackers: An Examination of Electronic Monitoring of Youth in Practice,” 829.
Access to Services

Key Findings

- EM promotes good habits and provides access to better services than detention.
- Device stigma can inhibit youth’s access to services.
- The other detention alternatives provide youth much better access to services due to their lack of stigma, relationship-building components, and ability to connect youth to needed services.

Access to Services denotes the youth’s ability to access needed and rehabilitative services that meet their individual. According to interviews, youth for whom detention alternative programs would be justified are often high risk. It is therefore very important that any youth qualifying for electronic monitoring have access to needed services.94

Electronic Monitoring

Wearing an electronic device, besides supporting constructive habit-building, is not in itself rehabilitative.95 Interviewees noted that EM helps youth to get into the routine of going to school every day, coming home at a decent hour, and listening to their parents. These habits can be important for long-term rehabilitation.96 However, one of the main purposes of EM is that it enables most participants97 to be in their communities while accessing services that will foster their rehabilitation, which they are not able to do while detained.98 To ensure that their electronic monitoring program is rehabilitative, the San Francisco Sheriff’s Office connects all program participants to case managers that can connect them to needed services automatically.99

The stigma of EM may affect how those who are providing services to the youth, such as school teachers and administrators, see the youth, undermining the youth’s access to quality services.100 Judge Flores shared his belief that no child should ever wear an ankle monitor on their first day at a new school, an occasion which may not be uncommon as a youth’s criminal activity may result in school discipline as well as JPD involvement. A couple of interviewees also mentioned concerns that, if an employer sees the monitoring device, it could affect the youth’s ability to get or maintain a job.101

94 Mila Baranov and Emily Fox in discussion with the author.
95 Michele Fisher, Brian Payne, Alissa Riker, and Valentina Sedeno in discussion with the author.
96 Mila Baranov and Martha Martinez in discussion with the author.
97 Mila Baranov, notes to the author, May 4, 2022. On rare occasions, youth at the San Francisco Boy’s Shelter may also be placed on electronic monitoring.
99 Michele Fisher and Alissa Riker in discussion with the author.
100 Jessica Bishop in discussion with the author; A. Melendrez, “Through Their Eyes,” 113.
101 Jessica Bishop and Former EM Participant in discussion with the author.
Additionally, many interviewees mentioned that ankle monitors sometimes affect youths’ ability to participate in sports, which indicates this may be a common problem for participants.\textsuperscript{102} Supervising Probation Officer Martha Martinez elaborated that probation officers try to work with the youth on this by being attentive to sport season start dates and using sports participation as an incentive for the youth to comply with probation conditions. She also mentioned that being in such a pro-social, supervised activity can also decrease the need for other supervision.

\textit{Detention}

Juvenile Hall does have set programming, including schooling, but most of the programming is meant to be short term. Now that the state youth correctional facilities have closed, JPD is reassessing how to provide longer-term services to youth in detention settings.\textsuperscript{103} Because Juvenile Hall does not give youth the same access to community-based resources that could best fit their needs, the services offered in detention are not as helpful for the youth as could be provided by a detention alternative.

\textit{Other Detention Alternatives}

Because the other alternatives do not carry their own stigma, are rehabilitative in and of themselves, and foster relationships, they better support youths’ access to services.

First, the other detention alternative programs do not create the same stigma as EM because participation in the program does not involve physical indicators of probation status. Therefore, their participation in these programs has less of an impact in how others in the community perceive the youth.

More importantly, the relationship-building aspects of both the ERC and MNC HD programs are instrumental for long-term growth and opportunity. Several interviewees noted that the main way to nurture long-term rehabilitation is helping the youth to build positive relationships, particularly with adults who can open long-term opportunities suited to the needs and interests of the youth.\textsuperscript{104}

YCD has a strong reputation for providing services for Bayview youth and adults and connecting them to jobs and other opportunities.\textsuperscript{105} Valentina Sedeno, who manages re-entry services programs, including the ERC, for YCD, noted that the Evening Reporting Center program might be a little short to fully build rapport with youth—particularly as it takes time for the youth to engage in something court-ordered. Often, the rapport is just built as the program comes to an end and the youth transitions elsewhere. ERC does, however, provide enough time for the staff member to get to know the youth and their interests, and staff members then make an effort to identify programs of interest for the youth and facilitate an easy transition and warm handoff to whatever program follows ERC.

\textsuperscript{102} Mila Baranov, Hon. Daniel Flores, and Martha Martinez in discussion with the author.
\textsuperscript{103} Emily Fox in discussion with the author.
\textsuperscript{104} Jessica Bishop and Martha Martinez in discussion with the author.
\textsuperscript{105} Jessica Bishop in discussion with the author.
Through daily curfew calls and case management services, MNC HD case managers have great opportunity to get to know the youth.\textsuperscript{106} The case manager connects the youth to needed services and, in particular, helps the youth with any problems at school.\textsuperscript{107}

As a final note on access to services, of the alternatives to detention, ERC alone aims to be enjoyable to the youth, which increases what the youth will take away from the program. ERC staff provide the youth homework help, fieldtrips, and individually-tailored programming. The program keeps the youth from getting bored—which is important since boredom can lead to poor choices in terms of how youth fill their time—and exposes them to new ideas and opportunities.\textsuperscript{108} The less the youth sees a condition of release as such, the more likely they are to actually engage with and benefit from it. However, as the only program of the three to really involve in-person interaction, the caliber of this program was perhaps the most limited by the COVID-19 pandemic.\textsuperscript{109}

\textsuperscript{106} Martha Martinez in discussion with the author.
\textsuperscript{107} Jessica Bishop, Gustavo Santana, and Michelle Santiago in discussion with the author; JPD Participant Case Notes.
\textsuperscript{108} Martha Martinez in discussion with the author.
\textsuperscript{109} Jessica Bishop in discussion with the author.
Safety

**Key Findings**

- EM protects youth by encouraging their separation from dangerous places, people, and situations.
- Home confinement through EM may not be safe for all youth.
- The device itself physically hurts.
- ERC may also pose dangers to youth due to its location and/or peer enrollment, but also uniquely offers youth protection through its pick-up and drop off service.

**Safety** encompasses the physical health and safety of the youth. An evaluation of youth wellbeing would not be complete without understanding how physical wellbeing is affected.

**Electronic Monitoring**

EM offers protection for high-risk youth by removing them from dangerous situations. Stayaway zones can help youth that are known or suspected to be gang-involved avoid gang hangouts or trigger areas, facilitating their separation from criminal activity.® Curfew can also keep youth from going out at late hours of the night, where they might engage in poor behaviors or even be victims of sexual exploitation. Additional, several interviews noted that being on EM can serve as an excuse that the youth can use to get out of risky or dangerous activity when being peer pressured.

However, one concern that is universal to any electronic monitoring program is that being confined to the home is not in every youth’s best interest.® A youth’s home life may be stressful due to “overcrowding or poor relationships with other residents.”® Participant case notes for JPD’s program showed cases where EM participants were witness or subject to domestic violence and/or were frequently in conflict with other members of the house. In some of these cases, family conflict led to youth breaking their curfews or stayaway orders or even cutting off their monitoring devices.® The former EM participant interviewed also noted that not all youth in San Francisco have happy homes or homes where you would want to be stuck for long periods of time.

Additionally, interviewees with lived ankle monitoring experience noted that the monitoring device physically hurts. Judge Flores remembered the hard plastic overlay of the device pressing into his ankle. He wrapped an ACE bandage under the device to take some of the pressure off of his ankle. The former EM participant still remembers the heavy weight of the device.

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110 Martha Martinez in discussion with the author.
111 Jessica Bishop, Martha Martinez, and the former EM participant in discussion with the author.
112 Emily Fox and the former EM participant in discussion with the author.
114 Crump, “Tracking the Trackers: An Examination of Electronic Monitoring of Youth in Practice,” 816.
115 JPD Participant Case Notes.
Other Detention Alternatives

Participating in the ERC program may actually pose some risk to the youth. Several interviewees noted that, while youth from all over the city are welcome at the center, some youth may face risks if they go, or the youth or their family may be scared for the youth to go, into the neighborhood where the center is located. Probation officers and ERC staff check for safety concerns and will address any that are identified, but safety concerns may be difficult to determine if the youth does not feel comfortable sharing or admitting that information.

Additionally, if two participants come from rival neighborhoods, it may not be safe for them to participate in the program at the same time. When that happens, YCD waits to enroll the youth who was referred second until the other has completed the program or refers them elsewhere.

In contrast, the pick-ups and drop-offs that are unique to ERC program can support the safety of the youth. Several interviewees noted that traveling through the city, whether for fun or just to and from school, can be dangerous for some youth, to the point where youth are even ordering Ubers for themselves. The program transportation offers them security that they usually lack.

There were no particular findings about how MNC HD affects participant safety.

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116 Jessica Bishop, Martha Martinez, and Valentina Sedeno in discussion with the author.
117 Martha Martinez in discussion with the author.
118 Valentina Sedeno in discussion with the author.
119 Jessica Bishop, Martha Martinez, and Valentina Sedeno in discussion with the author.
120 Valentina Sedeno in discussion with the author.
Racial and Ethnic Disparities

**Key Findings**

- Disparities are similar to those of detention and JPD’s other two detention alternatives, but African American or Black and AAPI youth are more likely to be detained than released on EM while Latino/a or Hispanic and white youth are more likely to be released on EM.
- Race and Ethnicity were not predictive of whether a youth would be assigned to detention, release with electronic monitoring, or release without electronic monitoring.
- Racial and ethnic disparities are also evident in 1) the number of times a youth is ordered to EM, 2) the amount of time a youth spend on EM, 3) the age of first referral to EM, and 4) program success rates.

Racial and Ethnic Disparities include differences in inclusion, treatment, or experiences in electronic monitoring among racial and ethnic groups. Due to the harms and benefits of EM outlined in the Study Motivations section, racial and ethnic program disparities are important to identify and minimize. In 2020, JPD enumerated specific Racial Equity Goals as an “explicit commitment to advancing racial equity across operations.”

**Detention Decision Outcomes**

Given that African American youth make up only 6% of San Francisco’s youth population, the proportion of youth that are detained or placed on a detention alternative that are African American is alarming. While African American youth are disproportionately the largest racial and ethnic group across all programs studied in this report, the proportion of African American youth is highest in detention, suggesting that African American youth may have a higher likelihood of detention than their peers. In contrast, white and Latino/a or Hispanic youth generally make up increasingly lower proportions of programs as the programs’ restrictiveness increases.

**Table 2: Racial & Ethnic Proportions of JPD-Involvement, Detention, & Detention Alternatives**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Unique Youth, %</th>
<th>JPD</th>
<th>Detained</th>
<th>EM</th>
<th>ERC or MNC HD</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>African American</td>
<td>50</td>
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<td>54</td>
<td>59</td>
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<tr>
<td>AAPI</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latino/a or Hispanic</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>White</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>All Instances, %</th>
<th>JPD</th>
<th>Detained</th>
<th>EM</th>
<th>ERC or MNC HD</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>African American</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AAPI</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>9</td>
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<td>Latino/a or Hispanic</td>
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<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>White</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*July 2018 – December 2022. Note that some of youth may have fallen into multiple categories (i.e. may have been detained and on EM). A youth was considered detained if they were detained for over 7 days.

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Additionally, the number of times that a youth is ordered to electronic monitoring is disproportionate across racial and ethnic groups, with African American and AAPI youth ordered to the highest number of episodes, and white youth ordered to the fewest.\textsuperscript{123}

While these disparities are alarmingly large, probit regression results did not show race to be predictive of one’s likelihood of detention as compared to release after their first offense when controlling for covariates. Additionally, race was not predictive of one’s likelihood of release with EM in comparison to detention or in comparison to release without EM. If anything, the direction of the estimates suggest that minority youth might be more likely receive the less restrictive treatment than white peers with similar criminal backgrounds and other demographic characteristics. The main predictors of detention decisions were risk level, highest referral offense, age, San Francisco residency status, the referral date relative to the onset of the pandemic.\textsuperscript{124}

\textit{EM Experience}

There were also large racial disparities in EM exposure and outcomes.

White youth spent significantly less time on EM, on median and on average, than youth of other races and ethnicities. AAPI youth spent the longest amount of time on EM on average, both per episode and in total. Youth that were not African American, AAPI, Latino/a or Hispanic, or white, spent the longest time in the program on median.

\begin{figure}[h]
\centering
\includegraphics[width=\textwidth]{Program-Length-By-Race-and-Ethnicity.png}
\caption{Program Length By Race and Ethnicity, July 2018 - December 2021}
\end{figure}

\textsuperscript{123} Dataset compiled by author. Between July 2018 – December 2021, African American and AAPI youth ordered to EM averaged 1.7 episodes. Latino/a or Hispanic youth had 1.5 episodes on average, and white youth had an average of 1.25 episodes.\textsuperscript{124} For more information about the probit regression model and covariate controls used to generate these findings, see the previous methodology section. The exact estimates and their statistical power for these estimates can be found in Appendix III.
The age at which a minority youth was first put on EM was also significantly younger, with white participants being nearly two years older than African American and AAPI participants on average. All 13 youths put on EM at least once before their fourteenth birthday were youth of color. In contrast, the youngest white participants were 16.\textsuperscript{125}

Completion rates across different racial and ethnic groups also varied. White youth completed the program at over 1.5 times the rate of African American, Latino/a or Hispanic participants.\textsuperscript{126} In an OLS regression showing what factors most closely predicted program success, race was not predictive of program success; however, age, what number episode it was for a youth, and episode length were statistically significant predictors of program success. Racial and ethnic disparities in these of aspects of EM exposure therefore likely explain racial and ethnic disparities in program outcomes.\textsuperscript{127}

Given JPD’s status as a juvenile justice leader and commitment to racial equity goals, great effort must be made to limit the disparities faced by youth in JPD’s most restrictive programs. Considering the harms of detention, youth of different races and ethnicities should not be sorting between detention and its alternatives at different rates. Moreover, because EM too is harmful to youth, a youth’s exposure to the program should not vary by race or ethnicity either. If EM perpetuates the racial disparities of detention, it is not an adequate alternative to detention.

\textsuperscript{125} Overall, the average starting age of EM was 15.7 for AAPI participants, 15.6 for African American participants, 16.2 for Latino/a or Hispanic participants, and 17.4 for white participants.

\textsuperscript{126} While 70\% of episodes for white participants ended successfully during this time period, the rates for African American, AAPI, and Latino/a or Hispanic participants were 45.8\%, 45.5\%, and 65.6\%, respectively.

\textsuperscript{127} This OLS regression included covariates on race, gender, age, episode number, and program length. For coefficient estimates and p-values for each covariate, see Appendix IV.
Recidivism

Recidivism is the continuance of criminal activity during or following probation intervention. Measuring recidivism is the default test for any justice program’s effectiveness in maintaining public safety. However, several interviews did underscore that recidivism rates form an incomplete picture of what is actually happening in the program, particularly since EM is generally recommended for youth at high risk of reoffending. Additionally, not all criminal activity is detected, and law enforcement is not uniform across all areas in a jurisdiction or all populations.

By design, EM is intended to decrease the recidivism of release youth, and interviewees’ descriptions of EM supported these claims. Deputy Probation Officer Jessica Bishop noted that when youth know they are being watched, they will “act accordingly”, which can be particularly important if parents are not able to provide that structure at home. Curfew in particular keeps the youth from getting into trouble late at night. Moreover, as noted in the Youth Safety section, youth can use EM to get out of undesirable activities in which peers are pressuring them to participate.

Release with EM versus Detention

Using the nearest neighbor matching model, as described in the methodology, electronic monitoring participants were shown to have .64 more overall referrals and .42 more referrals leading to petitions on average than detained youth after one year.

- There was no statistical difference in referrals involving new criminal offenses.

- Across the various measure of recidivism and time frames, EM recidivism rates were not shown to be statistically different from those of release without EM.

Key Findings

- EM participants had .64 more overall referrals and .42 more referrals leading to petitions on average than detained youth after one year.
  
- There was no statistical difference in referrals involving new criminal offenses.

- Across the various measure of recidivism and time frames, EM recidivism rates were not shown to be statistically different from those of release without EM.

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128 Jessica Bishop, Michele Fisher, and Alissa Riker in discussion with the author.
129 Maria McKee, note to the author, May 2, 2022.
130 See Appendix II for the full list of findings for all recidivism measures and time periods.
effect is not significant. Additionally, for transparency, these numbers were not statistically significant when checking for robustness by varying the covariates included.

If looking at the 90% confidence level, EM does have a similarly large effect on the likelihood that recidivism occurs at least one year after arrest in comparison to detention across all three recidivism types.\(^\text{131}\)

Because of the greater ability to monitor a youth’s actions, a higher recidivism rate among EM participants in comparison to those detained may merely reflect a higher likelihood to get caught for offences committed while on electronic monitoring, so the estimate may overestimate the youth’s likelihood to reoffend.\(^\text{132}\) By the same logic, estimates about EM in comparison to those released may then be underestimates of EM’s effect.

**Release with EM versus Release without EM**

The model did not identify any statistical differences across any measure of recidivism or time period between those released with EM and those released without EM. However, the direction of all of the estimates suggest that EM may lower recidivism across these groups. This indicates that release without EM creates no higher risk to the public than release with EM.

\(^\text{131}\) The three types of recidivism measured in this evaluation are new referrals, new referrals involving new offenses, and new referrals that lead to petitions.

Enforcement Mechanism

Key Findings

- Of the detention alternatives, EM provides the more comprehensive surveillance.
- The reliability of that surveillance is hindered by poor technology, low compliance with charging, and slow and inconsistent responses to violations.
- The other detention alternatives rely on parental supervision, rather than formal JPD supervision, for large parts of the day, and there can be lags in responses to violations.

Enforcement Mechanism includes how EM monitors participants and protects against continued wrongdoing. Doubts around electronic monitoring programs’ ability to deter and prevent crime mandate the inclusion of this section in this evaluation.

Electronic Monitoring

Of the alternatives to detention, EM provides the most comprehensive surveillance of the youth when they are released back into the community. Supervising Probation Officer Mila Baranov noted that for high-risk youth, particularly those under 24-hour house arrest, there would be no way to replicate the program besides having a person with the youth at all time.

However, over the course of the evaluation, severe handicaps to the program’s surveillance of high-risk youth were noted.

To begin, two device limitations threaten the program’s ability to assure surveillance of youth at high risk of reoffending.

First, the device requires frequent charging. The fact that charging is a common violation is concerning as it defeats the purpose of the program if the device dies and is not able to track the location of the youth, posing a risk to public safety. While a device dying may be due to the difficulty the youth has remembering to charge, some youth will also intentionally let the device die to avoid tracking.

Second, there are occasional issues with data collection, which can “definitely detract from some of [JPD’s] ability to do supervision.” Satellite signal gets lost in certain buildings and areas of the city. The data from this time may still be collected when the connection is regained.

“The GPS devices lose the satellite connection, so then there’s like ‘violation, violation, violation.’” – Martha Martinez, Supervising Probation Officer

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133 Mila Baranov and Jessica Bishop in discussion with the author.
134 Mila Baranov and Valentina Sedeno in discussion with the author.
135 Mila Baranov in discussion with the author.
136 Mila Baranov and Martha Martinez in discussion with the author.
reestablished, but sometimes is not. While probation officers are careful not to penalize youth for any of these false violations, it can be difficult to differentiate violations due to the youth and violations due to the device. Participants may also be frustrated if blamed for violations that turn out to be false. Other studies on electronic monitoring have found that the “extra noise” of false violations can be bad since it can cause agent complacency and failure to act when a real violation occurred.

More important than device error is that nearly all interviewees noted frustrations among many different stakeholders that violations were not being properly monitored or adequately answered. There appears to be delay in responses as well as grey area in who should respond and what the response should be.

Judge Daniel Flores noted that he could not always trust JPD to monitor the youth that he placed on EM. He mentioned, for example, that sometimes he would hear about a violation three weeks later for which JPD should have requested an arrest warrant, but that, by the court date, no action would have been taken. This lack of trust in the program may limit its ability to get youth out of detention, since judges may be more hesitant to release a high-risk youth if he or she does not believe JPD will enforce the program.

Inversely, probation officers sometimes felt like the juvenile court judge was not responding to violations as they should, either by not setting any consequences for violations or deciding a youth has successfully completed the program even though they are still frequently violating program conditions. This problem occurs in Adult Probation as well.

Parents get angry as well when they do not see consequences for violations that they witness, particularly since trying to meet program requirements may be affecting their daily lives.

Many interviewees agreed that responses to violations need to be swift, and if they were not going to be swift, then there was no need for the program. This immediacy was especially important given the age and needs of participants. Probations officers mentioned how they could see youth “testing the waters” with stayaway and curfew violations. By responding swiftly, probation officers can stop that behavior before it becomes a safety concern; not responding at all, on the other hand, will encourage the behavior. Moreover, swift accountability can help a youth to understand that someone really does take an interest in what they are doing and care about them. Interviewees did note that responses do not need to be overly punitive, could be creative, and certainly did not need to involve detention. Sometimes it could just require a phone call.

137 Martha Martinez in discussion with the author.
138 Gabriel Calvillo in discussion with the author.
140 Jessica Bishop and Martha Martinez in discussion with the author.
141 Gabriel Calvillo in discussion with the author.
142 Jessica Bishop in discussion with the author.
143 Jessica Bishop, Gabriel Calvillo, Hon. Daniel Flores, Emily Fox, and Martha Martinez in discussion with the author.
144 Jessica Bishop and Martha Martinez in discussion with the author.
145 Jessica Bishop, Hon. Daniel Flores, and Martha Martinez in discussion with the author.
146 Hon. Daniel Flores in discussion with the author.
call checking in with the participants, asking the participant to come in to visit their probation officer more often, or community service.  

The degree to which violations are monitored is up to the probation officers’ discretion. While some alerts, such as device tampering, are automatic, probation officers have some choice over what violations they receive and how. Moreover, there is no set protocol for the speed or degree to which probation officers respond to violations. Participant case notes recorded several instances of probation officers talking to youth or their parents about violations days or a week after they had occurred. One note even revealed that a probation officer only realized that a youth had taken off her ankle monitor while visiting the youth at her school.

According to interviews, the Sheriff’s Department has many levels of supervision. Their electronic monitoring vendor and Sheriff’s Department officers monitor for violations and check in with the participant when the violation has occurred based on the procedure for that level of violation. Alameda County Probation Department’s vendor, Tyler Supervision, also takes a more active role in monitoring the devices, serving as the main monitor from 8:00 – 5:00 PM Mondays-Fridays. Alameda probation officers also conduct at-home check ins for youth, but for their home supervision program, not electronic monitoring.

**Detention**

Several interviewees acknowledged that detention offers the greatest security against recidivism, but that that security needs to be balanced with the wellbeing of the youth. Moreover, if the needs of the youth are better met, that does more for long-term rehabilitation.

**Other Detention Alternatives**

Under the ERC and MNC HD programs, youth are not under formal JPD supervision for long periods of time during the day, particularly at night when the youth are most likely to engage in problematic behavior. During these times, parents are responsible for supervising the youth.

However, interviewees did underscore that youth in the Evening Reporting Center program are still formally supervised for a large chunk of the day, and a chunk of the day—after school—in which adolescent misbehavior is common. Due to the pick-up and drop off service, youth are directly accounted for from the time school ends until they are dropped off at night with their caregivers.

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147 Jessica Bishop, Gabriel Calvillo, Hon. Daniel Flores, and Martha Martinez in discussion with the author.
148 Mila Baranov in discussion with the author.
149 JPD Participant Case Notes.
150 Michele Fisher and Alissa Riker in discussion with the author.
151 Laura Chavez (Chief of Research and Evaluation, Alameda County Probation Department) in discussion with the author, April 7, 2022.
152 Mila Baranov and Gabriela Bayol in discussion with the author.
153 Gabriela Bayol in discussion with the author.
154 Martha Martinez in discussion with the author.
155 Jessica Bishop, Emily Fox, and Valentina Sedeno in discussion with the author.
156 Jessica Bishop and Valentina Sedeno in discussion with the author.
ERC staff wonder why their program is necessary if the youth is dual-enrolled in EM since they see the ERC’s purpose as supervision; if the youth is already on EM, the ERC program is redundant. It can be particularly frustrating to work around the youth’s stayaway orders.  

The most common violation in ERC is youth not showing up for the program; repeated absences will lead to program failure. Again, it is up to the probation officer and the juvenile court judge to decide the consequences for any violations or program failure.

MNC HD’s main enforcement of surveillance is having the parent or caregiver confirm that the youth is home with them. Whether the youth stays home after that, or what the youth participated in earlier that day, is left up to the youth based on trust and parental guidance. The enforcement capability of curfew calls has also been undermined with the loss of landline phones, as case managers do not have the ability to ensure that the youth are at home if the youth are answering a cell phone.

The most common violation in the ERC program is youth not showing up for the program; repeated absences will lead to program failure. The most common violations in MNC HD are youth missing their curfew calls or going out after the curfew calls have been made. If a violation occurs, the program staff report the violation to the youth’s probation officer. However, it is up to the probation officer and the juvenile court judge to decide the speed of the response as well as any consequences for any violations or program failure.

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157 Valentina Sedeno in discussion with the author.
158 Ibid.
159 JPD Participant Case Notes.
160 Valentina Sedeno in discussion with the author.
161 Mila Baranov in discussion with the author.
162 Valentina Sedeno in discussion with the author.
163 Jessica Bishop in discussion with the author.
164 Emily Fox in discussion with the author; JPD Participant Case Notes.
Victim Perception

**Key Findings**

- Victims see all three detention alternatives as less safe and punitive than detention.
- Educating victims on detention alternatives and reason for non-punitive rehabilitation can help to reduce frustration with decisions to release.
- Knowing that a youth has been released may increase or decrease victims’ engagement with the court, depending on the victim.

**Victim Perception** includes victims’ reactions, both emotional and behavioral, to EM. JPD’s mission includes the ensuring victims have opportunity for restoration. According to Deputy Chief Michele Fisher of the Sheriff’s Office, victim perceptions of their own safety during the pretrial period may also affect their decision to engage in the court proceedings.

**Electronic Monitoring**

According to Victim Advocate Gabriela Bayol, victims do not believe EM offers much in terms of public safety. Victims have shared their concerns with her that the devices do not have much power in preventing further criminal activity and that the devices are easy to remove. Bayol noted that she often needs to explain what the program consists of to the victims, and that she herself has a cursory understanding of the program.

Some victim frustration with the perceived leniency of the program stems from the feeling that the program is not punitive enough given the offense against the victim. Bayol shared that part of the Victim Advocate role is also explaining that the purpose of juvenile justice is rehabilitation rather than punishment as that focus better serves the community in the long run. Note that people who have been on electronic monitoring perceive it as more punitive than those who have not. 165

The public can be stressed when they find themselves in the vicinity of someone who might be involved in criminal behavior. Seeing an electronic monitoring device on someone nearby makes the public feel unsafe, as those who have worn ankle monitors notice in the reactive behavior of those around them. 166 Bayol remarked that telling victims that a youth has been released can cause unnecessary stress. As stress can manifest into physical health problems, minimizing stress where possible is important for public safety. 167

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166 Jessica Bishop and Hon. Daniel Flores in discussion with the author.
Concerns that the release of detained persons may discourage victims from taking part in legal proceedings came up in the literature review and one interview.\textsuperscript{168} While Bayol noted that some victims may be less inclined to participate in the court proceedings if the youth is released, that would likely be because they feel that they are not being listened to—for instance, the judge may have ruled against the victim’s request to detain the youth—not necessarily out of fear of the consequences of participating in the court proceedings. In fact, Bayol predicted that hearing that a youth is released would most likely inspire greater engagement in the process.

\textit{Detention and Other Detention Alternatives}

Likely due to their limited understanding in nuances between programs, the public perception of safety does not seem to vary much across detention alternatives. According to Bayol, what it comes down to for victims is knowing whether the person is in or out of detention, though EM might be seen as the most extreme of the detention alternatives. Knowing that the youth are detained make victims feel safer.

Bayol shared that, if a youth is to be released, victims seem to be most assured of their safety when the parents seem to be actively engaged in the proceedings and demonstrate their willingness to oversee the youth’s progress through their court conditions.\textsuperscript{169}

\textsuperscript{168} Michele Fisher and Alissa Riker in discussion with the author; Erez et al., “GPS Monitoring Technologies and Domestic Violence: An Evaluation Study,” ii.
\textsuperscript{169} Gabriela Bayol in discussion with the author.
**Program Workload**

**Key Findings**

- EM provides probation officers some insight into their youth, but less than the other detention alternatives, and requires much more time from probation officers than the other programs.
- The electronic monitoring vendor, SCRAM, could better support JPD with this program.

Measuring the **Program Workload** illustrates how conducting the program fits in with the department’s ability to carry out its overall mission. In the literature and interviews, concerns about the work and technical ability required for this program highlighted the cost that electronic monitoring programs can have on overall department operations.

**Electronic Monitoring**

Observing a youth’s behavior on EM can help probation officers get to know their clients, which can be helpful for their ability to serve their clients. Supervising Probation Officers Mila Baranov and Martha Martinez commented that one may know that a youth is engaging in problematic behaviors like breaking curfew or going into bad areas, but EM data can help start the conversation about why the youth is doing it and how changes could be made.

However, fully carrying out the program as would be most successful for the youth and public safety requires great effort on the part of probation officers. It can be difficult for them to, on a daily basis, contact or physically catch up with youth who have frequent charging, curfew, or stayaway violations in addition to their other duties. Effectively programming the youth’s activity schedule and locations and establishing communication processes with youth and the family can alleviate some of this workload.\(^{170}\) While JPD previously had an employee specifically devoted to EM, that role was ended in late 2021 due to the low number of EM participants.\(^{171}\)

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\(^{170}\) Martha Martinez in discussion with the author.

\(^{171}\) Maria McKee (JPD Director of Research and Planning), notes to the author, March 16, 2022.
Several deficiencies in the electronic monitoring vendor company, SCRAM of California, may be undercutting the success of JPD operations. One probation officer noted that SCRAM employees are rarely in the office, making her wonder what service SCRAM really provides. Moreover, whether due to communication errors between JPD or SCRAM or poor record keeping, some of SCRAM’s records are inaccurate. Accessing SCRAM’s full data records can also be difficult. If the company collecting monitoring data cannot be relied up to correctly hold and share that information, it undermines the entire program. While the contracted services are likely very different, the Sheriff’s Office staff reported much higher satisfaction for their vendor, Sentinel, who enrolls all participants, live monitors devices, and offers client and probation officer support for violations.

*Other Detention Alternatives*

The JPD staff interviewed lauded the reports that they receive for youth enrolled in the Evening Reporting Center and Home Detention programs. They said the reports provided insight into the youth and the youth’s progress. They also noted that it’s reassuring to know that the youth is checking in every day with someone and were home at night.

Additionally, a couple probation officers mentioned how MNC HD curfew calls can help to build trust between case managers and the youths’ parents, which then makes the parents more comfortable with sharing their concerns about the youth or any probation violations they see the youth committing.

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172 Jessica Bishop in discussion with the author.
173 Michele Fisher and Alissa Riker in discussion with the author.
174 Emily Fox and Martha Martinez in discussion with the author.
175 Jessica Bishop in discussion with the author.
176 Ibid.
**Recommendations**

Based on the findings outlined in the previous section, recommendations are categorized into two areas: 1) Changes to EM and 2) Changes to Other Detention Alternatives. Within changes to EM, recommendations are broken down by whether they affect program design or program implementation.

**Changes to EM**

**Program Design**

*I. Utilize a less conspicuous monitoring devices that requires less charging.*

One of the largest shortcomings of EM is that the size and visibility of the device hurts both the youth and the public. The stigma, however, is “most definitely not useful or necessary for the purpose of the program.” If the device were less identifiable, the damaging stigma of being in the program would lessen, reducing EM’s negative impact on youth’s personal relationships and engagement in prosocial activities such as school, work, and community programming. Moreover, on the part of the general public, not knowing the criminal background of those around them may reduce unnecessary stress.

A device with a better battery could greatly improve the effectiveness of monitoring by better upholding public safety as well as increasing youths’ ability to successfully complete the program. A larger window for charging would allow more opportunity for checking in with a youth who is not charging—whether intentionally or accidentally—and ensuring their device gets charged. The Deputy Chief of the Sheriff’s Office, Michele Fisher, noted that since her department’s device requires charging only every four days, though charging for one hour per day is recommended, and there are several points for checking in with the participant, there is “not a scenario where somebody's device just goes dead.”

Nearly every person interviewed brought up the fact that in 2022, there must be a better technological alternative by now that the department could use, and several possibilities were identified by this evaluation. E-cell offers a GPS-tracking, tamperproof wrist watch that pairs with a phone. Geofences can be set up, and probation officers would have the ability to live monitor the youth. The watch only requires 30 minutes of charging and lasts for up to 60 days. Through the phone app, probation officers could also set up mandatory check-ins, at times and frequencies of their choosing, and send court reminders. Alameda, who is open to exploring alternatives to an ankle monitor, is considering this option.

Additionally, several smartphone-based monitoring programs should be considered: TrackTech TRACKphone, Telmate Guardian, BI Mobile, and Outreach Smartphone Tech. All include GPS-tracking, options for communicating with the youth through the app, and the ability to send court

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177 Mila Baranov, email to the author, May 4, 2022.
178 Laura Chavez in discussion with the author.
reminders. The participant’s proximity to their phone is verified through check ins, though the nature of the check ins and probation officer ability to choose the check ins varies by program. Most explicitly include the ability to individually set up geofences and notification settings. One even includes the ability for victims to be notified if their alleged offender is near their location.

II. Do Not Use for Youth Under Age 14

Due to the low success rates at this age and the severe trauma of the program, youth below the age of 14 should be ineligible for the program. State law already sees the detainment of this younger population of juveniles as distinct. The city should similarly weigh the youth’s age in their decision to release and use a less restrictive detention alternative. Between July 2018 – December 2021, 25 EM episodes involved youth under age 14, and the majority of these youth were on it more than once before they turned 14.

Given the difficulty of meeting EM conditions due to adolescent development, as well as the stigma and harm that can come from participating and failing the program, JPD should take great caution in assigning EM to youth over the age of 14 as well. Their ability to adhere to strict conditions, based on their age, development, learning abilities, or other information, should be assessed and verified before placing them on EM rather than a less restrictive detention alternative.

III. Create Clear Eligibility Criteria for Program Participation

Noting its restrictiveness and negative impact on youth, many interviewees stressed the need to ensure that EM only be used when appropriate. Interviewees often noted that youth who have multiple offenses, are gang-affiliated, require strict stay away orders, and/or are getting into trouble late at night were well suited to the program as the safety of a victim or the youth were at risk. JPD and the court should develop a formal procedure for assessing the degree to which the safety of a victim or the youth are at risk and a level at which the risk warrants EM rather than another detention alternative. This could also help to alleviate disparities in detention decisions.

Both Alameda County and Santa Clara County are currently working on improving their assessment tools and moving away from focusing on youth “risk” in favor of strengths. Alameda County may be able to offer JPD good insight into how to establish these thresholds as their current assessment tool draft includes a score level that specifically recommend home supervision for youth scoring in the moderate range.

179 San Francisco Juvenile Probation Department, Data Deep Dive: JPD Detention Risk Instrument (DRI) Analysis, 9. While some juvenile offenses mandate detention, the state does not mandate detention for anyone under the age of 14.
180 Laura Chavez and Holly Child in discussion with the author.
181 Laura Chavez in discussion with the author.
IV. Program Length Should Never Exceed 90 Days; 30 Days Should Be Standard Maximum.

Given the support of interviewees for shorter program lengths and the fact that average success rates decreased after four weeks, the program should not extend past one month except in particular circumstances where the additional time is clearly expected to yield program success. Even if special circumstances warrant some extension, after 90 days is met, the program is clearly not working for the youth, and other options should be pursued. Between July 2018 – December 2021, a little over 10% of EM episodes lasted for longer than 90 days. Over 60% exceeded 30 days.

If a youth is assigned to EM multiple times, the total time spent on the program should still never exceed 90 days.

V. Provide CBO Case Managers for Everyone on Electronic Monitoring

When EM is used, it should be paired with case management to ensure that the youth can build relationships with others and be connected to services that match their interests, and that case management should be able to continue after EM has been completed if needed. As described in the findings, interviewees stated that such relationships are key for rehabilitating youth. Two JPD staff members, Emily Fox and Martha Martinez, underscored the importance of having specific services integrated rather than just available to guarantee that youth have easy, quick access to needed services.

Moreover, case managers would also offer probation officers the ability to learn about the youth on their caseload and to judge the suitability of EM. While the other two detention alternatives provide thorough reports on youth progress and activity, EM only provides probation officers datapoints on the youth’s whereabouts and probation violations.

Many youth that are on EM are already dual-enrolled in the Home Detention program for case management. However, the association of that case manager with probation supervision may reduce the youth’s engagement in that service. In contrast, a case manager that is part of an outside service provider, such as the Center of Juvenile and Criminal Justice Detention Diversion Advocacy Program, may be seen with more trust.

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182 See Appendix I for details.
Program Implementation

VI. Designate a Person to Monitor EM Data

In order to assure proper monitorization of EM devices, JPD needs to have a designated person for monitoring the devices at all times. This could be fulfilled by recreating a staff role designated to EM, adding greater vendor duties, or a combination thereof. This would additionally help probation officers by reducing their workload of the program and allowing them to focus on their essential duties. Until proper monitoring can be assured, the program does not serve its purpose.

VII. Enhance Data Collection

JPD should take more care in how it records program dates and program outcomes, as their current data system sometimes conflicted with case notes. SCRAM cannot be relied up to provide this data both due to their data inaccuracies and standard of only keeping information on a youth’s latest EM episode. Moreover, JPD should begin to collect data on whether the reason for EM failure is failure to adhere to program conditions, cutting off the device or absconding, or committing a new offense, as well as track whether reincarceration, another program or placement, or another attempt at EM followed that failure. This enhancement in data collection would allow JPD to more regularly evaluate the program and quickly see big picture youth and public safety outcomes. This collection could be part of the responsibility of the newly appointed monitoring role.

VIII. Formalize Meaningful Responses to Program Violations

The apparent lack of response to violations, the great amount of discretion in responses, and the slow speed at which responses occur must be remedied with a standardized violation response policy. These responses do not need to be a sanction or punishment, but should demonstrate to the youth that someone is paying attention to—and cares about—the youth’s actions. Such a policy would better support public safety and the long-term rehabilitation of JPD-involved youth. Moreover, the current lack of standardization could be unfair to youth as well as make the program conditions less clear to the youth. Probation officer discretion could still be allowed, as they best know the youth and their motivations, but a standard should be used in the large majority of cases.

Other California counties could serve as possible models for how JPD could structure responses. Glenn County has a graduated protocol of consequences for different violations. Recognizing that “early intervention can usually get a youth back on track,” Santa Clara arranges CFT meetings for youth that have non-law violations. For instance, if a youth spends over 5 hours in unauthorized locations, whether due to a stayaway or curfew, that automatically leads to a CFT meeting to check in on how youth could be better supported.

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184 Holly Child, email to the author, May 9, 2022.
185 Holly Child in discussion with the author.
IX. Use Days on Electronic Monitoring as Credits for Time Served

Due to the trauma and burden of being on the device, as well as the intention that this program facilitate rehabilitation by allowing youth to return to their communities, the amount of time a youth spends on EM should count as part of any sentence they receive. Though non-participants may underestimate the punitive nature of EM, the program is highly restrictive and can be distressing, so youth deserve credit for that time. Currently, in San Francisco juvenile cases, the amount of time on EM does not count toward time served at all.

The need for recognizing time spent on electronic monitoring as time served has already been noted on the state-level, and indeed pending state legislation may mandate this soon anyway. However, regardless of the outcome of that legislation, San Francisco should make the effort to adopt this policy as soon as possible. The San Francisco’s Sheriff’s Office has already adopted this policy for its electronic monitoring program.\textsuperscript{186}

\textsuperscript{186} Michele Fisher and Alissa Riker in discussion with the author.
Changes to Other Detention Alternatives

X. Develop Out-of-County Detention Alternatives

The current near-blanket use of EM for out-of-county youth that are released from detention should be ended due to the trauma of the program and the great potential for net-widening. As 150 youth from Alameda County and 115 youth from Contra Costa County were involved with JPD between July 2018 and December 2021, JPD should build out their detention alternatives for youth from these counties to ensure that as many youth under JPD’s supervision have access to less restrictive interventions as is feasible.

Partnerships with sister agencies or community-based organizations in these counties could serve as great resources for identifying and developing possible options.

XI. Expand the Evening Reporting Center Program

The Evening Reporting Center offers the services that most interviewees felt would be most constructive for these youths; however, weekend services as well as additional center locations could better support youth.

Currently, ERC only operates Monday-Friday, which leaves the youth without any prosocial activities or supervision scheduled for the weekends. This lack of youth oversight on the weekend contributes to dual enrollment between this program with EM and/or home detention, and dual enrollment can be overwhelming to youth. Moreover, weekend hours would open up a safe location during that time for youth who do not feel safe at home or want to avoid peers that encourage delinquent behavior. The former EM participant believes that youth in San Francisco would appreciate having such a place to go.

As safety concerns either about the location or about concurrent participation between rival youth currently inhibit participation of some youth in the program, having additional programs in other parts of the city may improve youth safety as well as eligibility for this program. Currently, use of this program is low, but greater accessibility of the program, both due to location and decreased overlap between rival participants, as well as less reliance on EM if weekend oversight can be assured may increase the need for the program.

Young Community Developers has indicated that it is open to adapting the program to serve the needs of JPD—and particularly needs of justice-involved youth and their families—so the community partner may be open to these program changes. These changes would require additional funding as YCD does not currently have the capacity to offer weekend services.

187 Dataset compiled by author.
188 Valentina Sedeno in discussion with the author.
189 Emily Fox and Valentina Sedeno in discussion with the author.
190 Valentina Sedeno, email to the author, May 7, 2022.
Areas for Further Research

Determination of Reason for Racial Disparities

Due to the small number of EM participants, this evaluation was only able to compile descriptive statistics rather than determine causal inference for racial disparities in the program. However, the history of racism in the U.S. justice system, the trauma that can be inflicted by this program, and JPD’s commitment to racial equity necessitate further investigation into and eradication of the cause of these disparities.

Exploration of Electronic Monitoring Participants’ Case Notes

The case notes of EM participants could be used to count the frequency and type of common program violations as well as note the consequences of those violations. Moreover, the case notes include some insight into participants’ views of the program and reasons for violations. While these notes are not complete, an in-depth review of these notes would provide a more complete view of the impact of this program on youth wellbeing. Due to the time constraints of this evaluations, such a review was not possible for this evaluation.

Repetition of Evaluation

JPD should continue to evaluate EM. The possible negative effects of this program necessitate careful program planning, and effective public policy should be based on quality research. Moreover, the effects of the pandemic and any implemented recommendations from this evaluation could have unpredicted ramifications for the effectiveness of the program. If JPD improves their data tracking of the program, regular evaluation should not be a heavy lift.

Investigate the Possibility of a Group Home Alternative to Electronic Monitoring

The former EM participant strongly recommended that JPD offer a group home alternative to EM for would-be participants whose home environments are stressful or dangerous and/or find the stigma particularly painful. Because the youth would still be monitored at all times—either while at the group home or while in an approved activity—this alternative would assure the same level of public safety as the electronic monitoring device does.

However, removing youth from their homes can be counterproductive for long-term rehabilitation, and some group homes mirror detention settings.191 Some interviewees also noted that current group home settings do not offer substantial services to youth.192 Additionally, the Close Juvenile Hall Working Group decried the high failure rates and poor culture competency of existing group homes in its final report.193

Given these mixed findings, JPD should investigate the viability of this option.

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191 Gustavo Santana, Michelle Santiago, and Valentina Sedeno in discussion with the author.
192 Emily Fox in discussion with the author.
Conclusion

When it is the only alternative to detention possible, the San Francisco Juvenile Probation Department’s electronic monitoring program offers some benefits to youth. It provides the youth greater liberty, fosters their safety, and may serve as a needed excuse to get out of undesirable activities. Moreover, EM appears to better serve youth than most electronic monitoring programs in California. However, EM inflicts harm on participants and inadequately upholds public safety, demanding reevaluation of how and when the program will be used moving forward.

The main harms to youth stem from the stigma of participation, the difficulty of program requirements, and the continued, albeit lessened relative to detention, loss of liberty. A less identifiable device requiring less charging, age restrictions and time limits for participation, and more clearly enumerated criteria for participation would better shield justice-involved youth from unnecessary harm. Moreover, a case manager could improve participants’ access to services and ability to complete the program. It is also important that San Francisco recognize at an institutional level the hardship of EM by providing adjudicated youth credit for time served.

EM, as well as the other detention alternatives, largely perpetuates the racial and ethnic disparities of detention. Such disparities, though common to criminal justice departments across the country, cannot be allowed to persist.

Regarding public safety, EM may increase recidivism when used instead of detention and decrease recidivism when used instead of release without EM. However, the effect was not statistically significant for most recidivism types or time periods measured. Moreover, any differences in recidivism must be weighed against the benefits of a less restrictive intervention to youth, which likely helps recidivism in the long run.

The biggest threat to public safety this evaluation found is the lack of speedy or consistent responses to program violations. If the noted behavior is not noticed and addressed appropriately with the youth, any poor behavior may continue or escalate. EM would improve with a designated person monitoring violations as well as a standard procedure for addressing violations. Unless this shortcoming is resolved, this program is not upholding public safety as it should, and is therefore only a punitive measure for youth.

Changes to EM could also better aid probation officers in serving San Francisco. While EM reports do provide probation officers some insight into their youth, assigning the youth to another detention alternative or ensuring a case manager for all EM participants would provide probation officers more in-depth information while also freeing up time for other duties.

It is important that JPD succeed in its efforts to minimize the detention of youth in San Francisco. Due to the harm it inflicts upon youth, EM cannot be the means to de-carceralization in San Francisco, but may be an interim solution until a better alternative is developed. By following the recommendations shared in this report, JPD could minimize the pains of the program while EM exists. JPD’s priority, however, should be exploring and developing other options for detention alternatives that will be less harmful to youth.
Appendices

Appendix I: EM Descriptive Statistics

Overview

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<th>Measure</th>
<th>Value</th>
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<td>Episodes</td>
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<td>Unique Youth</td>
<td>288</td>
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<tr>
<td>Average Episodes Per Youth</td>
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<td>Maximum Occurrences Per Youth</td>
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Program Length

**Episode Length**

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<th>Measure</th>
<th>Value</th>
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<tr>
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<tr>
<td>Median Episode Length</td>
<td>37 days</td>
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<td>Maximum Episode Length</td>
<td>342 Days</td>
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**Total Time on EM Per Youth**

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<th>Value</th>
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<tr>
<td>Average Time on EM</td>
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<tr>
<td>Median Time on EM</td>
<td>56 Days</td>
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<td>Maximum Time on EM</td>
<td>404 Days</td>
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![Program Length Chart](chart.png)
## Success Rate

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Overall</th>
<th>55%</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>First Episode</td>
<td>62.8%</td>
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### By Age, Overall

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Age</th>
<th>Youth</th>
<th>Success Rate</th>
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</thead>
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<tr>
<td>&lt;14</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>12.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>34.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>41.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td>106</td>
<td>53.8%</td>
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<tr>
<td>17</td>
<td>133</td>
<td>66.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18+</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>83.6%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### By Age, First Episode

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Age</th>
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<th>Success Rate</th>
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</thead>
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<tr>
<td>&lt;14</td>
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<td>7.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
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<td>15</td>
<td>40</td>
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<td>16</td>
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<tr>
<td>17</td>
<td>82</td>
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<tr>
<td>18+</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>89.4%</td>
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### By Episode Length

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<th>Youth</th>
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<td>Under 1 week</td>
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<td>1-2 weeks</td>
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<td>2-4 weeks</td>
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<td>4-6 weeks</td>
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<td>6-8 weeks</td>
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<tr>
<td>8-12 weeks</td>
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<td>59.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Over 12 weeks</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>60.0%</td>
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Appendix II: Recidivism Rates

Nearest Neighbor Match Model Findings

Findings, Controlling For Youth’s Risk Score, Highest Offense, and Demographics

Electronic Monitoring vs. Detention

| Recidivism Type | Time Period | Pop. Avg. | Matched Avg. | Estimate of EM Effect | Std. Error | z     | P>|z|  | 95% Con. Interval |
|-----------------|-------------|-----------|--------------|-----------------------|------------|-------|------|------------------|
| Any Referral    | 6 mo.       | .175      | .225         | .164                  | .131       | 1.26  | .208 | -.092 to .422   |
|                 | 1 year      | .245      | .315         | .213                  | .128       | 1.66  | .096** | -.038 to .463   |
| New Offense     | 6 mo.       | .142      | .170         | .169                  | .126       | 1.34  | .18  | -.078 to .416   |
|                 | 1 year      | .206      | .261         | .216                  | .122       | 1.77  | .077** | -.023 to .456   |
| Referral -> Petition | 6 mo. | .063      | .101         | .074                  | .101       | .73   | .467 | -.125 to .272   |
|                 | 1 year      | .119      | .191         | .169                  | .099       | 1.71  | .088** | .025 to .362    |

| Recidivism Type | Time Period | Pop. Avg. | Matched Avg. | Estimate of EM Effect | Std. Error | z     | P>|z|  | 95% Con. Interval |
|-----------------|-------------|-----------|--------------|-----------------------|------------|-------|------|------------------|
| Any Referral    | 6 mo.       | .267      | .352         | .136                  | .166       | .82   | .414 | -.190 to .462   |
|                 | 1 year      | .512      | .692         | .642                  | .311       | 2.07  | .039* | .033 to 1.252   |
| New Offense     | 6 mo.       | .227      | .271         | .090                  | .174       | .52   | .605 | -.251 to .430   |
|                 | 1 year      | .440      | .596         | .461                  | .331       | 1.39  | .164 | -.187 to 1.108  |
| Referral -> Petition | 6 mo. | .089      | .141         | .107                  | .123       | .87   | .384 | -.134 to .349   |
|                 | 1 year      | .238      | .384         | .408                  | .201       | 2.03  | .043* | .014 to .803    |

Covariance Balance Checks

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>6 Months After Arrest</th>
<th>1 Year After Arrest</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Obs. = 71, EM = 16, Detained = 55, Matches = 16</td>
<td>Obs. = 52, EM = 11, Detained = 41, Matches = 1</td>
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<tr>
<td>Standardized Differences</td>
<td>Variance Ratio</td>
<td>Standardized Differences</td>
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<td>Raw</td>
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<td>Risk Level</td>
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</table>

* indicates statistical significance at 95% CI. ** indicates statistical significance at 90% CI.
## Electronic Monitoring vs. Release

### Occurs

| Recidivism Type | Time Period | Pop. Avg. | Matched Avg. | Estimate of EM Effect | Std. Error | z     | P>|z|   | 95% Con. Interval |
|-----------------|-------------|-----------|--------------|-----------------------|------------|-------|-------|-------------------|
| Any Referral    | 6 mo.       | .156      | .254         | -.0831                | .089       | -.94  | .348  | -.257             | .090               |
|                 | 1 year      | .204      | .389         | -.192                 | .102       | -1.89 | .059**| -.391             | .007               |
| New Offense     | 6 mo.       | .145      | .242         | -.083                 | .089       | -.94  | .348  | -.257             | .090               |
|                 | 1 year      | .193      | .315         | -.192                 | .102       | -1.89 | .059**| -.391             | .007               |
| Referral -> Petition | 6 mo. | .090      | .179         | -.078                 | .085       | -.92  | .358  | -.244             | .088               |
|                 | 1 year      | .121      | .237         | -.139                 | .123       | -1.13 | .258  | -.308             | .102               |

### Count

| Recidivism Type | Time Period | Pop. Avg. | Matched Avg. | Estimate of EM Effect | Std. Error | z     | P>|z|   | 95% Con. Interval |
|-----------------|-------------|-----------|--------------|-----------------------|------------|-------|-------|-------------------|
| Any Referral    | 6 mo.       | .302      | .492         | -.125                 | .160       | -.78  | .433  | -.439             | .188               |
|                 | 1 year      | .542      | .901         | -.617                 | .437       | -1.41 | .158  | -1.474            | .240               |
| New Offense     | 6 mo.       | .283      | .408         | -.188                 | .168       | -1.12 | .264  | -.518             | .142               |
|                 | 1 year      | .496      | .823         | -.702                 | .408       | -1.72 | .085**| -1.501            | .097               |
| Referral -> Petition | 6 mo. | .179      | .324         | -.178                 | .152       | -1.17 | .241  | -.477             | .120               |
|                 | 1 year      | .304      | .537         | -.601                 | .376       | -1.60 | .110  | -1.377            | .136               |

### Covariance Balance Checks

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<th>6 Months After Arrest</th>
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Nearest Neighbor Match Model Findings Robustness Checks

While the previous set of covariates were chosen carefully identified as the best option for the model used in this evaluation, two other iterations of the nearest neighbor model were run with different sets of covariates to check the robustness of the findings. The output of these models can be found below.

Findings, Controlling For Risk Score and Highest Offense

Due to the racial and residencies disparities in EM use as well as the significant difference in program success by age, controlling for only risk score and highest offense was ruled out for the evaluation model due to its greater likelihood of bias.

Electronic Monitoring vs. Detention

| Recidivism Type | Time Period | Matched Avg. | Estimate of EM Effect | Std. Error | z | P>|z| | 95% Con. Interval |
|-----------------|-------------|--------------|-----------------------|------------|---|------|-----------------|
| Any Referral    | 6 mo.       | .225         | .075                  | .110       | .69 | .493 | -.140 to .290   |
|                 | 1 year      | .315         | .050                  | .107       | .47 | .638 | -.159 to .260   |
| New Offense     | 6 mo.       | .170         | .152                  | .107       | 1.41| .157 | -.059 to .363   |
|                 | 1 year      | .261         | .127                  | .105       | 1.21| .226 | -.079 to .333   |
| Referral -> Petition | 6 mo. | .101       | .104                  | .096       | 1.09| .276 | -.083 to .292   |
|                 | 1 year      | .191         | .135                  | .101       | 1.34| .180 | -.063 to .333   |

Count

| Recidivism Type | Time Period | Matched Avg. | Estimate of EM Effect | Std. Error | z  | P>|z| | 95% Con. Interval |
|-----------------|-------------|--------------|-----------------------|------------|---|------|-----------------|
| Any Referral    | 6 mo.       | .352         | .188                  | .171       | 1.10| .271 | -.147 to .522   |
|                 | 1 year      | .692         | .472                  | .289       | 1.63| .102 | -.094 to 1.039  |
| New Offense     | 6 mo.       | .271         | .233                  | .143       | 1.63| .102 | -.047 to .513   |
|                 | 1 year      | .596         | .345                  | .258       | 1.34| .181 | -.161 to .852   |
| Referral -> Petition | 6 mo. | .141       | .214                  | .111       | 1.93| .053**| -.003 to .431   |
|                 | 1 year      | .385         | .331                  | .173       | 1.92| .055**| -.007 to .670   |

Covariance Balance Checks

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### Electronic Monitoring vs. Release

**Recidivism Type** | **Time Period** | **Matched Avg.** | **Estimate of EM Effect** | **Std. Error** | **z** | **P>|z|** | **95% Con. Interval**
--- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | ---
Any Referral | 6 mo. | .254 | -.044 | .087 | -.50 | .616 | -.215 | .127
 | 1 year | .329 | -.102 | .092 | -1.10 | .271 | -.283 | .079
New Offense | 6 mo. | .242 | -.030 | .087 | -.034 | .736 | -.201 | .142
 | 1 year | .315 | -.088 | .092 | -.95 | .342 | -.269 | .093
Referral -> Petition | 6 mo. | .179 | -.069 | .079 | -.88 | .379 | -.224 | .085
 | 1 year | .237 | -.067 | .098 | -.69 | .491 | -.259 | .124

**Count**

| Recidivism Type | Time Period | Matched Avg. | Estimate of EM Effect | Std. Error | Z | P>|z| | 95% Con. Interval |
--- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | ---
Any Referral | 6 mo. | .492 | -.279 | .177 | -1.58 | .115 | -.627 | .068
 | 1 year | .901 | -.537 | .239 | -2.25 | .024* | -1.005 | -.069
New Offense | 6 mo. | .467 | -.310 | .140 | -2.21 | .027* | -.582 | -.035
 | 1 year | .823 | -.647 | .207 | -3.13 | .002* | -1.05 | .242
Referral -> Petition | 6 mo. | .325 | -1.51 | .119 | -1.28 | .202 | -.384 | .081
 | 1 year | .537 | -.322 | .226 | -1.42 | .154 | -.764 | .121

### Covariance Balance Checks

<table>
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Controlling For Risk Score, Highest Offense, Demographics, and Pre- or Post-COVID

While use of EM did change after the pandemic began, this nearest neighbor iteration was not able to maintain as good a level of balance between the treatment and control group, causing this iteration to also be ruled out for the model.

Electronic Monitoring vs. Detention

| Recidivism Type | Time Period | Matched Avg. | Estimate of EM Effect | Std. Error | z     | P>|z|   | 95% Con. Interval |
|-----------------|-------------|--------------|-----------------------|------------|-------|-------|------------------|
| Any Referral    | 6 mo.       | .225         | .139                  | .123       | 1.13  | .257  | -1.02 - .380     |
|                 | 1 year      | .315         | .187                  | .120       | 1.56  | .119  | -0.048 - .422    |
| New Offense     | 6 mo.       | .170         | .233                  | .121       | 1.92  | .055**| -0.005 - .471    |
|                 | 1 year      | .261         | .280                  | .123       | 2.28  | .023*| .039 - .521      |
| Referral ->     | 6 mo.       | .101         | .124                  | .109       | 1.14  | .256  | -0.090 - .338    |
| Petition        | 1 year      | .191         | .219                  | .112       | 1.96  | .050*| .000 - .438      |

| Recidivism Type | Time Period | Matched Avg. | Estimate of EM Effect | Std. Error | z     | P>|z|   | 95% Con. Interval |
|-----------------|-------------|--------------|-----------------------|------------|-------|-------|------------------|
| Any Referral    | 6 mo.       | .352         | .204                  | .206       | .99   | .323  | -2.00 - .607     |
|                 | 1 year      | .692         | .618                  | .243       | 2.54  | .011*| .142 - 1.094    |
| New Offense     | 6 mo.       | .271         | .159                  | .176       | .91   | .364  | -1.85 - .504     |
|                 | 1 year      | .596         | .436                  | .166       | 2.63  | .008*| .111 - .761     |
| Referral ->     | 6 mo.       | .141         | .142                  | .142       | 1.00  | .317  | -1.36 - .421     |
| Petition        | 1 year      | .385         | .174                  | .220       | .79   | .429  | -2.57 - .604     |

Covariance Balance Checks

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### Electronic Monitoring vs. Release

**Occurs**

| Recidivism Type | Time Period | Matched Avg. | Estimate of EM Effect | Std. Error | z     | P>|z|  | 95% Con. Interval |
|-----------------|-------------|--------------|-----------------------|------------|-------|------|------------------|
| Any Referral    | 6 mo.       | .254         | -.198                 | .122       | -1.62 | .105 | -.438            |
|                 | 1 year      | .329         | -.270                 | .122       | -2.22 | .026*| -.508            |
| New Offense     | 6 mo.       | .242         | -.198                 | .122       | -1.62 | .105 | -.438            |
|                 | 1 year      | .315         | -.270                 | .122       | -2.22 | .026*| -.508            |
| Referral -> Petition | 6 mo. | .179         | -.185                 | .112       | -1.66 | .098**| -.405            |
|                 | 1 year      | .237         | -.210                 | .135       | -1.56 | .120 | -.474            |

**Count**

| Recidivism Type | Time Period | Matched Avg. | Estimate of EM Effect | Std. Error | Z     | P>|z|  | 95% Con. Interval |
|-----------------|-------------|--------------|-----------------------|------------|-------|------|------------------|
| Any Referral    | 6 mo.       | .492         | -.210                 | .213       | -0.99 | .324 | -.627            |
|                 | 1 year      | .901         | -.738                 | .425       | -1.74 | .083**| -1.572           |
| New Offense     | 6 mo.       | .467         | -.272                 | .199       | -1.37 | .170 | -.662            |
|                 | 1 year      | .823         | -.811                 | .406       | -2.00 | .046*| -1.607           |
| Referral -> Petition | 6 mo. | .325         | -.227                 | .175       | -1.30 | .193 | -.569            |
|                 | 1 year      | .537         | -.361                 | .205       | -1.76 | .078**| -.763            |

**Covariance Balance Checks**

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62
Appendix III. Likelihood of Detention Decision Assignments After First Offense

A probit regression was used to identify how risk level, highest offense, gender, residency status, age, referral data relative to the pandemic, and race influenced the decision to release, release with EM, or detain a youth after their first referral to JPD.

### Likelihood of Detention after First Offense (Compared to Release with or without EM) (N = 479)

|                      | Coefficient | SE  | Z    | P>|Z| | 95% Confidence Interval |
|----------------------|-------------|-----|------|------|-------------------------|
| Risk Level           | .245        | .129| 5.21 | .000* | .419 - .923             |
| Highest Offense      | .029        | .008| 3.56 | .000* | .013 - .045             |
| Gender               | .044        | .187| .23  | .815  | -.323 - .411            |
| SF Residency         | -.757       | .171| -4.44| .000* | -1.09 - .423            |
| Age At Arrest        | .148        | .059| 2.51 | .012* | .032 - .264             |
| After COVID          | -.422       | .254| -1.66| .096**| -.919 - .075            |
| African American     | -.245       | .480| -.51 | .610  | -1.18 - .696            |
| AAPI                 | -.045       | .530| -.09 | .932  | -1.08 - .993            |
| Latino/a or Hispanic | -.396       | .492| -.80 | .421  | -1.36 - .569            |
| White                | .090        | .548| .16  | .870  | -1.98 - 1.16             |
| cons                 | -.477       | 1.24| -4.00| .000  | -7.41 - 2.54            |

*Youth of other races were the omitted variable for the race and ethnicity category.

### Likelihood of Release with EM after First Offense Compared to Detention (N = 87)

|                      | Coefficient | SE  | Z    | P>|Z| | 95% Confidence Interval |
|----------------------|-------------|-----|------|------|-------------------------|
| Risk Level           | -.212       | .254| -.83 | .404  | -7.10 - .286            |
| Highest Offense      | .004        | .020| .20  | .841  | -.036 - .044            |
| Gender               | .343        | .401| .85  | .393  | -.444 - 1.13            |
| SF Residency         | .141        | .359| .39  | .696  | -.564 - .845            |
| Age At Arrest        | -.055       | .129| -.43 | .670  | -.309 - .198            |
| After COVID          | 1.12        | .407| 2.76 | .006* | .326 - 1.92             |
| African American     | .227        | .598| .38  | .705  | -.945 - 1.40            |
| AAPI                 | .210        | .764| .27  | .784  | -.129 - 1.71            |
| Latino/a or Hispanic | .194        | .608| .32  | .749  | -.998 - 1.39            |
| cons                 | -.708       | 2.58| -.27 | .784  | -.576 - 4.35            |

*White race was the omitted variable for the race and ethnicity category.

### Likelihood of Release with EM after First Offense Compared to Release Without (N = 396)

|                      | Coefficient | SE  | Z    | P>|Z| | 95% Confidence Interval |
|----------------------|-------------|-----|------|------|-------------------------|
| Risk Level           | .472        | .210| 2.25 | .025* | .060 - .883            |
| Highest Offense      | .033        | .014| 2.26 | .024* | .004 - .061            |
| Gender               | .300        | .323| .93  | .353  | -.332 - .932            |
| SF Residency         | -.510       | .240| -2.12| .034* | -.098 - .039            |
| Age At Arrest        | .129        | .090| 1.43 | .152  | -.048 - .306            |
| After COVID          | .731        | .271| 2.69 | .007* | .199 - 1.26             |
| African American     | -.342       | .453| -.75 | .451  | -.123 - .547            |
| AAPI                 | -.350       | .561| -.62 | .532  | -.145 - .749            |
| Latino/a or Hispanic | -.475       | .457| -1.04| .298  | -.137 - .420            |
| cons                 | -5.745      | 1.89| -3.03| .002  | -9.45 - 2.03            |

*White race was the omitted variable for the race and ethnicity category.
Appendix IV. Factors Predicting EM Program Outcome Results

The findings for the OLS regression of gender, age, race and ethnicity, episode number, and episode length on program length are below:

Program Outcome (N = 422)

|                  | Coefficient | SE  | t    | P>|t| | 95% Confidence Interval |
|------------------|-------------|-----|------|-----|-------------------------|
| Gender           | .074        | .057| 1.30 | .194| -.038                   | .186       |
| Age              | .106        | .017| 6.39 | .000*| .073                    | .139       |
| African American | -.015       | .133| -.11 | .910 | -.276                   | .245       |
| AAPI             | -.068       | .153| -.44 | .657 | -.368                   | .232       |
| Latino/a or Hispanic | .075    | .136| .55  | .582 | -.192                   | .342       |
| White            | -.015       | .167| -.09 | .929 | -.344                   | .314       |
| Episode Number   | -.092       | .026| -3.61| .000*| -.143                   | -.042      |
| Episode Length   | .001        | .000| 2.55 | .001*| .000                    | .002       |
| _cons            | -1.14       | .299| -3.81| .000 | -1.73                   | -.552      |

*Youth of other races were the omitted variable for the race and ethnicity category.
Appendix V: Data Quality

SCRAM of California’s data on EM program participation and JPD’s diverged slightly. SCRAM of California’s data generally listed only one—the last—episode of EM per person, though there were three exceptions of people having double entries. JPD’s data logged all episodes of EM, though it lacked 26 sealed record episodes that were included in the SCRAM data. JPD’s data contained 161 episodes of EM that were not included in SCRAM due to being earlier episodes for a given person. Additionally, three people, each with one listed episode, were listed in the JPD data that were not included in the SCRAM data at all.

Additionally, each party collected slightly different information for their records. The sealed records in the SCRAM data set did not include demographic information nor any information about the referral or criminal offense that led to the order of electronic monitoring. Because of this, these records were only used for calculating overall success rates and episode length summary statistics. At the same time, only the SCRAM dataset recorded the reason for program failure, so any episodes listed only in the JPD data lacked this information. Therefore, the sample sizes for different statistics vary based on the availability of data for each of the compiled observations.

Additionally, there were slight variations in episode records between the two datasets. In 64 cases, the JPD and SCRAM data contained similar episodes where either a start date, end date, or both varied. Additionally, on occasion, the JPD data listed two EM episodes that covered the same time period represented by one episode in the SCRAM data. Where discrepancies occurred, the actual episode dates and breaks were confirmed using JPD’s participants’ case notes. When the case notes could not clarify the date, the JPD data was used as it was slightly more often correct according to the participant notes. One observation showing a negative episode length was dropped as the dates could not be verified. Additionally, some names were spelled differently in the databases.

In all, the SCRAM data contained 283 instances of EM, and JPD’s data contained 421. 257 entries were matched between the data sources based on the dates of the episodes, and any unmatched entries—26 from SCRAM and 164 from JPD—were still included to ensure no cases were overlooked. This led to a total of 447 EM episodes across 288 youth for the time period of July 2018 – December 2021.
Appendix VI: List of Interviewees

Juvenile Probation Department Staff

Mila Baranov
*Supervising Probation Officer, San Francisco Juvenile Probation Department*

Jessica Bishop
*Deputy Probation Officer/CFT Facilitator, San Francisco Juvenile Probation Department*

Emily Fox
*Community Partnership & Strategy Coordinator, San Francisco Juvenile Probation Department*

Martha Martinez
*Supervising Probation Officer, San Francisco Juvenile Probation Department*

Wider San Francisco Community Serving Justice-Involved Youth

Anonymous
*Former EM Participant*

Gabriela Bayol
*Victim Advocate, Victim Services Division, Office of District Attorney Chesa Boudin*

Hon. Daniel Flores
*Judge, San Francisco Superior Court*

Gustavo Santana
*Site Coordinator, Mission Neighborhood Centers*

Michelle Santiago
*Home Detention Program Case Manager, Mission Neighborhood Centers*

Valentina Sedeno
*Re-Entry Services Program Manager, Young Community Developers, Inc.*

Staff at Other Local Departments with Electronic Monitoring Programs

Gabriel Calvillo
*Former Supervising Probation Officer, San Francisco Adult Probation Department*

Laura Chavez
*Chief of Research and Evaluation, Alameda County Probation Department*

Holly Child
*Director of Research and Development, Santa Clara County Probation Department*

Michele Fisher
*Chief Deputy, San Francisco Sheriff’s Office*

Alissa Riker
*Director of Programs, San Francisco Sheriff’s Office*
Electronic Monitoring Research Experts

Catherine Crump  
*Director, Samuelson Law, Technology and Public Policy Clinic, University of California, Berkeley*

Brian Payne  
*Vice Provost for Academic Affairs, Old Dominion University*
Appendix VII. Bibliography

“About YCD.” Young Community Developers, Inc. 2021.


Mila Baranov, interview by Scarlett Saunders, February 11, 2022, interview 1, transcript and recording, personal records.

Gabriela Bayol, interview by Scarlett Saunders, April 18, 2022, interview 13, transcript and recording, personal record.


Jessica Bishop, interview by Scarlett Saunders, March 9, 2022, interview 5, transcript and recording, personal records.


Gabriel Calvillo, interview by Scarlett Saunders, April 1, 2022, interview 9, transcript and recording, personal records.

Laura Chavez, interview by Scarlett Saunders, April 7, 2022, interview 12, transcript and recording, personal record.

Holly Child, interview by Scarlett Saunders, April 25, 2022, interview 15, transcript and recording, personal record.


Catherine Crump, interview by Scarlett Saunders, April 19, 2022, interview 14, transcript and recording, personal record.


Michele Fisher and Alissa Riker, interview by Scarlett Saunders, April 6, 2022, interview 11, transcript and recording, personal record.

Daniel Flores, interview by Scarlett Saunders, February 18, 2022, interview 2, notes, personal records.

Former EM participant, interview by Scarlett Saunders, March 12, 2022, interview 6, transcript and recording, personal records.

Emily Fox, interview by Scarlett Saunders, February 23, 2022, interview 3, transcript and recording, personal records.


Martha Martínez, interview by Scarlett Saunders, March 4, 2022, interview 4, transcript and recording, personal records.


A. Melendrez. “Through Their Eyes: Stories of Reflection, Resistance, and Resilience on Juvenile Incarceration from San Francisco Cis and Trans Young Women, Trans Young Men and Boys and Gender Expansive Youth.” *Young Women’s Freedom Center* (February 2021).


Brian Payne, interview by Scarlett Saunders, March 31, 2022, interview 8, notes, personal records.


Gustavo Santana and Michelle Santiago, interview by Scarlett Saunders, March 29, 2022, interview 7, notes, personal records.

SCRAM of California. *SCRAM of California GPS Program Participant Agreement.*

Valentina Sedeno, interview by Scarlett Saunders, April 5, 2022, interview 10, notes, personal records.


