

San Francisco Redistricting vs. MI and Long Beach Redistricting

Element	SF RDTF	Michigan ICRC	Long Beach IRC	Comments re: SF RDTF
Type	Independent citizens commission, supported by Clerk of the Board and Department of Elections, and City Attorney staff.	Independent citizens commission, supported by Dept of State (DOS) staff, its own staff including Executive Director and General Counsel and budget.	Independent citizens commission, supported by City Manager, City Clerk, and City Attorney staff.	While the RDTF determines the final map w/out oversight, it does not have independent resources or control of staff or budget. In addition, other departments on which the RDTF relied did not necessarily receive budget augmentation. This has been problematic for ensuring adequate language access and scheduling meetings for example.
Outreach and representative candidate pool	Limited to standard City channels. No requirement for diverse candidate pool.	Application open to any registered voter w/o ties to candidates, electeds, party leaders, lobbyists, or staffers. DOS was required to do outreach and randomly invite 10k registered voters to apply, but actually invited 250k. Final pool of 9367 applicants was statistically weighted to represent MI's geography and demographics.	The City Clerk conducted outreach via traditional City channels, social media, TV ads, buses, billboards, and Census community partners. 400+ applicants screened by City Clerk for basic eligibility.	Only 35 applicants to SFEC. Only 8 applicants to BOS. Unknown number of candidates considered by Mayor. Some applied to multiple appointing authorities.

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<i>Selection criteria and process to reduce political influence</i>	Appointed by Mayor, BOS, and SFEC by different processes without standard qualification criteria or ban on conflicts of interest	200 semifinalists selected randomly and publicly—half invited and half from open applications. Legislative leaders can strike up to 20 from the pool before 13 are randomly and publicly chosen.	23 finalists selected by the Ethics Commission after vetting against standard criteria through an extensive application and review process. One Commissioner per district was randomly selected and those 9 were then tasked with selecting 4 more and 2 alternates.	BOS appoints 3 members despite direct vested interest. Mayoral appointment process is not public, and the Mayor might also be considered an interested party. Timing of financial disclosures and qualification criteria inconsistent between appointing authorities.
<i>Composition and diversity</i>	9 members: 3 selected by each appointing authority. No diversity or representation requirements	13 members: multi-partisan (4D, 4R, 5I). Compensation set at 25% of Governor's salary.	The original 9 reviewed remaining finalists and looked to fill the remaining spots with people that contributed specific skills, community of interest affiliation, and with a DEI lens as allowed without violating Charter criteria. Compensation of \$200 per Commission meeting.	Large enough (9 members for 11 districts). Although no requirement for diverse representation, past RDTFs have been diverse. However, lack of compensation may limit participation by those of lesser means.

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<i>Training and preparation</i>	City Attorney wrote several legal memos to the RDTF. Both the City Attorney & mapping consultant offered to train the RDTF.	Extensive legal and practical training, including from former CA CRC members.	Extensive training from former local and State Commissioners and other redistricting experts, as well as on Roberts Rules of Order, the Brown Act, Public Records Act, Redistricting Laws, our Charter and Bylaws, and other legal matters relevant to our work.	Multiple public comments about the lack of training. Untrained citizen members can expose the City to lawsuits, result in unequal participation, and destroy faith in elections due to a poorly-run process. Was training budgeted?
<i>Redistricting criteria</i>	Population equality within 5%, VRA (assumed), communities of interest (not defined)--no ranking	<p>Ranked criteria:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1) Federal law (Population equality & Voting Rights Act) 2) Contiguity 3) *Communities of interest 4) Partisan fairness 5) Disregard incumbency 6) County, city, township boundaries 7) Compactness <p>*Political parties were excluded as communities of interest.</p>	<p>Ranked criteria:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1) Population equality 2) Voting Rights Act 3) Contiguity 4) Respect for neighborhoods, 5) Communities of Interest 6) Not dividing neighborhoods that have a common history, culture, or language 7) Follow geographic and topographical city features 8) Districts should be understandable by voters 9) Compactness 10) Correspond to census blocks <p>Prohibitions against considering residence of any individual, including any incumbent, political candidate or parties.</p>	The 5% population equality requirement is more restrictive than the Equal Protection Clause and may force splits. The public and even RDTF members reported being unclear about why lines were reversed/changing during the process and what was being prioritized.

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Transparency	Public meetings governed by Sunshine ordinance & Brown Act, but no ban on discussing redistricting matters outside a public meeting	Bias toward transparency. Ban on ex-parte communication. 45-day public notice period for maps. Required written rationale for maps.	Championed transparency. Public meetings governed by the Brown Act, ban of discussing redistricting matters outside public meetings, banned ex-parte communications, standing agenda item that required Commissioners to disclose any communication they received regarding redistricting, published schedule and notice period for maps. Live line drawing of maps in scheduled public meetings.	This RDTF reversed an 8-1 vote on a map at 2:53am. Members allegedly had private meetings with groups and even elected officials. The media reported on “opaque processes” and private texts.
Draft Maps and timeline	None required. Only final deadline stipulated	Draft map required several months before final map. Required public hearings before mapping and again after mapping, as well as a final public comment period of 45 days before map adoption.	Required minimum number of meetings and number of days for the public to review and comment on draft maps, then elevated a proposed final map with time allowed for the public to review and comment. Mapping timeline can be seen here: http://longbeach.legistar.com/View.ashx?M=F&ID=9833494&GUID=0D557769-B6D6-485E-9443-9AC00862E3E4	This RDTF did not start drawing lines until a month before the deadline and did not publish an official draft map with sufficient time for the public to consider and propose creative alternatives. Consider a deadline tied to Census data availability.

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<i>Voting to approve maps</i>	Simple majority: 5 (of 9) votes	Special majority: 7 (of 13) votes with at least 2R-2D-2I votes.	Supermajority: 9 (of 13) votes	This RDTF only achieved the barest majority vote, reducing confidence in the result. A supermajority requirement encourages collaboration and creative problem-solving and may ensure minority rights.
<i>Recourse if no agreement on final map</i>	Unclear	Maps selected randomly from the pool of final maps submitted by each Commissioner.	Superior Court decides	This RDTF exposed the City to a lawsuit due to failure to meet the deadline. A well-designed backup plan can be motivating if not preferential to the body's success.
<i>Replacement/removal of members</i>	RDTF members serve at the pleasure of their appointing authority	Removal only due to neglect of duty or gross misconduct. Must be replaced with an alternate from the finalist pool.	The Commission may remove a commissioner for substantial neglect of duty, gross misconduct in office, or inability to discharge the duties of office. Chair randomly selects one of the alternates.	The public came to SFEC to remove its appointees. Unclear how we would have replaced any members had we chosen to remove.